Inadmissibility for Two CIMT Convictions

Section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), provides: “Any alien who at any time after admission is convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, regardless of whether confined therefor and regardless of whether the convictions were in a single trial, is deportable.”

For more information see article on INA §237(a)(2)(A)(ii).

When are two convictions arising out of a single scheme?

The BIA addressed this issue in the first decision of 2025 issued on January 31, 2025, Matter of Baeza Galindo, 29 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 2025).

(1) Proximity in time is necessary but not sufficient to conclude that two crimes arise from a single scheme of criminal misconduct under section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2018). Matter of Adetiba, 20 I&N Dec. 506, 509 (BIA 1992), clarified.

(2) Two crimes involving moral turpitude, premised on separate turpitudinous acts with different objectives, neither of which was committed in the course of accomplishing the other, constitute separate schemes of criminal misconduct.

Full Decision

Two crimes arise from the course of the same criminal conduct when the conduct is required to complete the offense. So when a lesser included offense is committed during the course of the primary offense then it arises from the same criminal conduct.

An act that is done as part of the same criminal offense but is not required to complete that offense is a separate act of criminality and thus a second offense. For example, shooting at a police officer that responds to a robbery call is a second offense because it was not part of the robbery itself.

In this case the Respondent was fleeing the scene of an aggravated assault he committed when he drove his truck into two young mothers and their infants then failed to stop and render aid. His failure to stop and render aid was not part of the aggravated assault that he committed, rather, it was part of his trying to get away with it. It was a separate criminal act that he committed.

“The aggravated assault with a deadly weapon was not intended to facilitate the accomplishment of later failing to stop and render aid. See Matter of Baeza Galindo, 29 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 2025) (citing Matter of Z-, 6 I&N Dec. at 171).

RULING

Two crimes involving moral turpitude, premised on separate turpitudinous acts with different objectives, neither of which was committed in the course of accomplishing the other, constitute separate schemes of criminal misconduct.