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2024 HHS Poverty Guidelines
Sponsor’s Household Size 150% of HHS Poverty Guidelines* 1 $22,590 2 $30,660 3 $38,730 4 $46,800 5 $54,870 6 $62,940 7 $71,010 8 $79,080 Add $8,070 for each additional person source: https://www.uscis.gov/i-912p
CITATIONS FOR SUBMISSIONS TO IMMIGRATION COURT
Legal Citations Generally When filing papers before EOIR, parties should keep in mind that accurate and complete legal citations strengthen the argument made in the submission. This Appendix provides guidelines for frequently cited sources of law. EOIR generally follows A Uniform System of Citation (also known as the “Blue Book”) but diverges from that convention in certain instances. EOIR appreciates but does not require citations that follow the examples used in this Appendix. Note that, for the convenience of filing parties, some of the citation formats in this Appendix are less formal than those used in the published cases of the BIA. Once a source has been cited in full, the objective is brevity without compromising clarity. This Appendix concerns the citation of legal authority. For guidance on citing to the record and other sources, see ICPM, Chapter 3.3(e) (Source Materials), Chapter 4.19(f) (Citation); BIA PM Chapter 3.3(e) (Source Materials), Chapter 4.6(d) (Citation). As a practice, EOIR prefers italics in case names and publication titles, but underlining is an acceptable alternative. Abbreviations in Case Names As a general rule, well-known agency abbreviations (e.g., DHS, INS, FBI, DOJ) may be used in a case name, but without periods.  If an agency name includes reference to the “United States,” it is acceptable to abbreviate it to “U.S.”  However, when the “United States” is named as a party in the case, do not abbreviate “United States.”  For example: DHS v. Smith not D.H.S. v. Smith; U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Smith not United States Department of Justice v. Smith; United States v. Smith not U.S. v. Smith. Short Form of Case Names After a case has been cited in full, a shortened form of the name may be used thereafter, with a reference to the specific page number that is cited.  For example: INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 (1984); Phinpathya, 464 U.S. at 185; Matter of Nolasco, 22 I&N Dec. 632 (BIA 1999); Nolasco, 22 I&N Dec. at 635. Citations to a Specific Point ****Citations to a specific point should include the precise page number(s) on which the point appears.  For example: Matter of Artigas, 23 I&N Dec. 99, 100 (BIA 2001). Citations to a Dissent or Concurrence Citations to a dissent or concurrence should be indicated in a parenthetical notation.  For example: Matter of Artigas, 23 I&N Dec. 99, 109-110 (BIA 2001) (dissent). Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions Published Decisions Precedent decisions by the BIA are binding on the immigration courts, unless modified or overruled by the Attorney General or a federal court.  All precedent BIA decisions are available on the EOIR website.  Precedent decisions should be cited in the “I&N Dec.” form illustrated below.  The citation must identify the adjudicator (BIA, A.G., etc.) and the year of the decision.  Note that there are no spaces in “I&N” and that only “Dec.” has a period. For example: Matter of Balsillie, 20 I&N Dec. 486 (BIA 1992). “Matter of” not “In re” All precedent decisions should be cited as “Matter of.”  The use of “In re” is disfavored.  For example:  Matter of Yanez, not In re Yanez. Unpublished Decisions Citation to non-precedent Board cases by parties not bound by the decision is discouraged.  When it is necessary to refer to an unpublished decision, the citation should include the initials of the respondent’s full name separated by hyphens, the A-number with all but the last three digits of the number replaced with X’s, and a parenthetical containing the abbreviation “BIA” as the adjudicating body, as well as an abbreviation of the month as part of the precise date of the decision.  Because the Board uses “Matter of” as a signal for a published or precedent case, do not use “Matter of.” When citing to an Unpublished BIA decision, a full copy of the unpublished decision should be provided as an attachment to the brief/motion if possible. Unpublished BIA Decisions from the EOIR FOIA Reading Room Where an unpublished Board decision is obtained from EOIR’s FOIA Reading Room, the citation should be placed within a parenthetical containing the assigned Folder Name (also known as Title or File number assigned to Download Folder), the abbreviation “BIA” as the adjudicating body, and an abbreviation of the month as part of the precise date of the decision.  As noted above, because the Board uses “Matter of” of as a signal for published or precedent case, do not use “Matter of.” Interim decisions While the BIA still assigns precedent decisions an interim decision number for administrative reasons, the proper citation is always to the volume and page number of the bound volume – the I&N Decision citation. Attorney General Decisions Precedent decisions by the Attorney General are binding on the immigration court and the BIA and should be cited in accordance with the rules for precedent decisions by the BIA.  All precedent decisions by the Attorney General are available on the EOIR website.  Matter of Y-L-, 23 I&N Dec. 270 (AG 2002). Federal and State Courts Generally Federal and state court decisions should generally be cited according to the standard legal convention, as set out in the latest edition of A Uniform System of Citation (also known as the “Blue Book”).  For example: Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990); Singh v. Holder, 749 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2014); Velasquez-Escovar v. Holder, F.3d, No. 10-73714 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Madera, 521 F. Supp. 2d 149 (D. Conn. 2007). U.S. Supreme Court The Supreme Court Reporter citation (“S. Ct.”) should be used only when the case has not yet been published in the United States Reports (“U.S.”). Unpublished Cases Citation to unpublished state and federal court cases is discouraged.  When citation to an unpublished decision is necessary, a copy of the decision should be provided, and the citation should include the docket number, court, and precise date.  Parties are also encouraged to provide the LexisNexis or Westlaw number.  For example: Bratco v. Mukasey, No. 04-726367, 2007 WL 4201263 (9th Cir. Nov. 29, 2007) (unpublished). Precedent Cases Not Yet Published When citing to recent precedent cases that have not yet been published in the Federal Reporter or other print format, parties should provide the docket
Class of Admission Codes
When a person arrives at a port of entry seeking entry to the United States they will either be admitted or paroled into the country (if they are permitted to enter). A person who is being permitted to enter on a temporary basis or under special conditions because they lack a proper visa or immigration status to enter will typically be “paroled.” A legal permanent resident or a noncitizen arriving with a valid visa are “admitted” to country. Often times the admission is marked in the person’s passport, though that is becoming less common. The class of admission can be seen on an I-94 as a code as well in some internal agency documents you may find in the responsive record of a FOIA request. Legal Permanent Resident cards “green cards” will display the class of admission code which indicates the manner in which their residency was obtained. The classes of admission and the corresponding codes are listed below broken down into several different categories of types of admission. Immigrant Classes of Admission A lawful permanent resident (LPR) or “green card” recipient may live and work anywhere in the United States and may apply to become U.S. citizens if they meet certain eligibility and admissibility requirements. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides several broad classes of admission for foreign nationals to gain LPR status, the largest of which focuses on admitting immigrants for the purpose of family reunification. Other major categories include economic and humanitarian immigrants, as well as immigrants from countries with relatively low levels of immigration to the United States. IMMEDIATE RELATIVE PETITIONS The largest category of new LPRs consists of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens (spouses, children, and parents of U.S. citizens age 21 and older). Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens are not subject to numerical limits and typically account for more than 40 percent of new LPRs annually. IR1 Spouses, new arrivals IR6 Spouses, adjustments CR1 Spouses, new arrivals, conditional CR6 Spouses, adjustments, conditional IB1 Spouses, new arrivals, self petitioning IB6 Spouses, adjustments, self petitioning IW1 Spouses, widows or widowers, new arrivals IW6 Spouses, widows or widowers, adjustments CF1 Spouses, entered as fiance(e), adjustments, conditional IF1 Spouses, entered as fiance(e), adjustments IR2 Children, new arrivals IR7 Children, adjustments CR2 Children, new arrivals, conditional CR7 Children, adjustments, conditional AR1 Children, Amerasian, new arrivals AR6 Children, Amerasian, adjustments IB2 Children, new arrivals, self petitioning IB7 Children, adjustments, self petitioning IB3 Children of IB1 or IB6, new arrivals IB8 Children of IB1 or IB6, adjustments IW2 Children of IW1 or IW6, new arrivals IW7 Children of IW1 or IW6, adjustments CF2 Children of CF1, adjustments, conditional IF2 Children of IF1, adjustments IH3 Children adopted abroad under the Hague Convention, new arrivals IH8 Children adopted abroad under the Hague Convention, adjustments IH4 Children to be adopted under the Hague Convention, new arrivals IH9 Children to be adopted under the Hague Convention, adjustments IR3 Orphans adopted abroad, new arrivals IR8 Orphans adopted abroad, adjustments IR4 Orphans to be adopted, new arrivals IR9 Orphans to be adopted, adjustments IR5 Parents of adult U.S. citizens, new arrivals IR0 Parents of adult U.S. citizens, adjustments IB5 Parents battered or abused, of U.S. citizens, new arrivals, self petitioning IB0 Parents battered or abused, of U.S. citizens, adjustments, self petitioning FAMILY PREFERENCE CATEGORIES Family members not included in the immediate relative class of admission may be eligible for immigration under family-sponsored preferences. These categories also allow for the beneficiary to bring derivative family members. Categories are organized by priority. More about family preference categories. A11 Unmarried Amerasian sons/daughters of U.S. citizens, new arrivals A16 Unmarried Amerasian sons/daughters of U.S. citizens, adjustments F11 Unmarried sons/daughters of U.S. citizens, new arrivals F16 Unmarried sons/daughters of U.S. citizens, adjustments B11 Unmarried sons/daughters of U.S. citizens, new arrivals, self petitioning B16 Unmarried sons/daughters of U.S. citizens, adjustments, self petitioning A12 Children of A11 or A16, new arrivals A17 Children of A11 or A16, adjustments F12 Children of F11 or F16, new arrivals F17 Children of F11 or F16, adjustments B12 Children of B11 or B16, new arrivals B17 Children of B11 or B16, adjustments F21 Spouses of alien residents, subject to country limits, new arrivals F26 Spouses of alien residents, subject to country limits, adjustments B21 Spouses of alien residents, subject to country limits, new arrivals, self petitioning B26 Spouses of alien residents, subject to country limits, adjustments, self petitioning C21 Spouses of alien residents, subject to country limits, new arrivals, conditional C26 Spouses of alien residents, subject to country limits, adjustments, conditional FX1 Spouses of alien residents, exempt from country limits, new arrivals FX6 Spouses of alien residents, exempt from country limits, adjustments BX1 Spouses of alien residents, exempt from country limits, new arrivals, self petitioning BX6 Spouses of alien residents, exempt from country limits, adjustments, self petitioning CX1 Spouses of alien residents, exempt from country limits, new arrivals, conditional CX6 Spouses of alien residents, exempt from country limits, adjustments, conditional F22 Children of alien residents, subject to country limits, new arrivals F27 Children of alien residents, subject to country limits, adjustments B22 Children of alien residents, subject to country limits, new arrivals, self petitioning B27 Children of alien residents, subject to country limits, adjustments, self petitioning C23 Children of C21, C22, C26, or C27, subject to country limits, new arrivals, conditional C28 Children of C21, C22, C26, or C27, subject to country limits, adjustments, conditional B23 Children of B21, B22, B26, or B27, subject to country limits, new arrivals B28 Children of B21, B22, B26, or B27, subject to country limits, adjustments F23 Children of F21, F22, F26, or F27, subject to country limits, new arrivals F28 Children of F21, F22, F26, or F27, subject to country limits, adjustments C25 Children of C24 or C29, subject to country limits, new arrivals, conditional C20 Children of C24 or C29, subject to country limits, adjustments, conditional B25 Children of B24 or B29, subject to country limits, new arrivals B20 Children of B24 or B29, subject to country limits,
Employment Authorization Category Codes
How To Find Out What your employment authorization category code is USCIS EAD Category Code  EAD Category Eligibility Description 180 Days Automatic Extension Eligibility A02 A lawful temporary resident pursuant to sections 245A or 210 of the INA No A03 Refugee Yes A04 Paroled as refugee No A05 Asylee (granted asylum) Yes A06 K1 non-immigrant fiancé(e) of US CitizenK2 child of K1 No A07 N-8 Parent of international organization employee granted permanent residenceN-9 Dependent Child of international organization employee granted permanent residence Yes A08 Citizen of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands or Palau admitted as a nonimmigrant Yes A09 K-3 nonimmigrant spouse of USCK-4 child of K-3 No A10 Granted Withholding of Deportation or Removal Yes A11 Deferred Enforced Departure (DED)   A12 Temporary Protected Status (TPS) granted under 8 CFR 244.12 Yes A13 IMMACT Family Unity beneficiary(Section 301 of the Immigration Act of 1990) No A14 LIFE Act Family Unity beneficiary(Section 1504 of the Legal Immigrant Family Equity (LIFE) Act Amendments) No A15 V-1 Spouse of Lawful Permanent ResidentV-2 Minor unmarried child of Lawful Permanent ResidentV-3 Minor unmarried child of V-1 or V-2 No A16 T-1 nonimmigrant (victims of severe forms of trafficking) No A17 Spouse of E-1/E-2 Treaty Trader/InvestorSpouse of E-3 specialty occupation professional from Australia Yes*(*timely filing before I-94 expiry ) A18 L2 spouse of an L1 visa intracompany transfer Yes*(*timely filing before I-94 expiry ) A19 U1 nonimmigrant (victims of certain criminal activity) No A20 U-2 spouse of U-1 aliensU-3 children of U-1 aliensU-4 parents of minor U-1 aliens (16 or under)U-5 unmarried sibling under age 18 of U-1 alien under age 21 No C01 Dependent of A-1 or A-2 foreign government official No C02 Dependent of TECRO (Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office) E-1 Non-immigrant No C03A Pre-completion OPT F1 visa students No C03B Post-completion OPT F1 visa students No C03C 24-month extension for Science, Technology, Engineering, or Mathematics (STEM) OPT students No C03(ii) F-1 student offered off-campus employment under the Sponsorship of Qualifying International Organization No C03(iii) F-1 student seeking off-campus employment due to severe economic hardship No C04 Spouse or unmarried dependent child of G-1, G-3 or G-4 nonimmigrant (Representative of International Organization and their dependents) No C05 J-2 spouse or minor child of a J-1 exchange visitor No C06 M-1 student seeking practical training after completing studies No C07 Dependent of NATO-1 through NATO-7 nonimmigrant No C08 Asylum applicant (w/ pending asylum application) who filed for asylum on or after January 4, 1995 Yes C09 Adjustment of status applicant Yes C10 Suspension of deportation applicants (filed before April 1, 1997)Cancellation of Removal applicantsCancellation applicants under NACARA Yes C11 An alien paroled into the United States in the public interest or temporarily for emergency reasons No C12 Spouse of an E-2 Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) investor; eligible for employment in the CNMI only No C14 Alien granted deferred action No C16 Registry applicant based on continuous residence since January 1, 1972 Yes C17(i) B1 nonimmigrant who is the personal or domestic servant of a nonimmigrant employer No C17(ii) B1 nonimmigrant domestic servant of a U.S. citizen No C17(iii) B1 nonimmigrant employed by foreign airline No C18 Alien with a final order of deportation/order of supervision; No C19 Temporary Protected Status applicant under 8 CFR 244.5 Yes C20 Alien who has filed a completed legalization application for special agricultural workers Yes C21  S visa non-immigrant No C22 Alien who has filed a completed legalization application under INA 245A Yes C23 Irish peace process (Q-2)   C24 LIFE legalization applicant Yes C25 T-2 spouse of T-1, victim of traffickingT-3 child of T-1T-4 parent of T-1 (if T-1 is under age 21) No C26  Certain H4 Visa spouses of H1B holders, qualify for it. Check Apply H4 EAD Guide  Yes*(*timely filing before I-94 expiry ) C27 Abused spouse of an A nonimmigrant No C28 Abused spouse of an E-3 nonimmigrant No C29 Abused spouse of a G nonimmigrant No C30 Abused spouse of an H nonimmigrant No C31 The principal beneficiary of an approved VAWA self-petitionQualified child of a beneficiary of an approved VAWA self-petition Yes C33 An alien who has been granted Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) No C35 The principal beneficiary of an approved employment-based immigrant petition facing compelling circumstances No C36 Spouse or unmarried child of a principal beneficiary of an approved employment-based immigrant petition facing compelling circumstances No
Establishing Extreme Hardship
See our blog post on extreme hardship. A. Totality of the Circumstances The officer must make extreme hardship determinations based on the factors, arguments, and evidence submitted.1 Therefore, the officer should consider any submission from the applicant bearing on the extreme hardship determination. The officer may also consider factors, arguments, and evidence relevant to the extreme hardship determination that the applicant has not specifically presented, such as those addressed in Department of State (DOS) information on country conditions2 or other U.S. Government determinations regarding country conditions, including a country’s designation for Temporary Protected Status (TPS). Officers must base their decisions on the totality of the evidence and circumstances presented. B. Common Consequences The common consequences of denying admission, in and of themselves, do not warrant a finding of extreme hardship.3 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has held that the common consequences of denying admission include, but are not limited to, the following: C. Factors Must Be Considered Cumulatively The officer must consider all factors and consequences in their totality and cumulatively when assessing whether a qualifying relative will experience extreme hardship either in the United States or abroad. In some cases, common consequences that on their own do not constitute extreme hardship may result in extreme hardship when assessed cumulatively with other factors.5 For example, if a qualifying relative has a medical condition that alone does not rise to the level of extreme hardship, the combination of that hardship and the common consequences of inferior medical services, economic detriment, or readjusting to life in another country may cumulatively cause extreme emotional or financial hardship for the qualifying relative when considering the totality of the circumstances.  Ordinarily, for example, the fact that medical services are less comprehensive in another country is a common consequence of denying admission; but the inferior quality of medical services, considered along with the individual’s specific medical conditions, may create sufficient difficulties as to rise to the level of extreme hardship in combination with all the other consequences. The officer must weigh all factors individually and cumulatively, as follows: First, the officer must consider whether any factor set forth individually rises to the level of extreme hardship under the totality of the circumstances.  ​Second, if any factor alone does not rise to the level of extreme hardship, the officer must consider all factors together to determine whether they cumulatively rise to the level of extreme hardship. This includes hardships to multiple qualifying relatives.  When considering the factors, whether individually or cumulatively, all factors, including negative factors, must be evaluated in the totality of the circumstances.  D. Examples of Factors that May Support a Finding of Extreme Hardship The chart below lists factors that an applicant might present and that would be relevant to determining whether an applicant has demonstrated extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. This list is not exhaustive; circumstances that are not on this list may also be relevant to finding extreme hardship.  The presence of one or more of the factors below in a particular case does not mean that extreme hardship would necessarily result from a denial of admission. But they are factors that may be encountered and should be considered in their totality and cumulatively in individual cases. All hardship factors presented by the applicant should be considered in the totality of the circumstances in making the extreme hardship determination. Some of the factors listed below apply when the qualifying relative would remain in the United States without the applicant. Other factors apply when the qualifying relative would relocate abroad. Some of the factors might apply under either circumstance.  Family Ties and Impact Qualifying relative’s ties to family members living in the United States, including age, status, and length of residence of any children. Responsibility for the care of any family members in the United States, particularly children, elderly adults, and disabled adults. Impact on the cognitive, social, or emotional well-being of a qualifying relative who is left to replace the applicant as caregiver for someone else, or impact on the qualifying relative (for example, child or parent) for whom such care is required. Social and Cultural Impact Loss of access to the U.S. courts and the criminal justice system, including the loss of opportunity to request or provide testimony in criminal investigations or prosecutions; to participate in proceedings to enforce labor, employment, or civil rights laws; to participate in family law proceedings, victim’s compensation proceedings, or other civil proceedings; or to obtain court orders regarding protection, child support, maintenance, child custody, or visitation. Fear of persecution or societal discrimination. Prior grant of U nonimmigrant status. Existence of laws and social practices in the country of relocation that would punish the qualifying relative because he or she has been in the United States or is perceived to have Western values. Access or lack of access to social institutions and structures (official and unofficial) for support, guidance, or protection. Social ostracism or stigma based on characteristics such as gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, religion, race, national origin, ethnicity, citizenship, age, political opinion, marital status, or disability.6 Qualifying relative’s community ties in the United States and in the country of relocation. Extent to which the qualifying relative has integrated into U.S. culture, including language, skills, and acculturation. Extent to which the qualifying relative would have difficulty integrating into the country of relocation, including understanding and adopting social norms and established customs, including gender roles and ethical or moral codes. Difficulty and expense of travel/communication to maintain ties between qualifying relative and applicant, if the qualifying relative does not relocate. Qualifying relative’s present inability to communicate in the language of the country of relocation, as well as the time and difficulty that learning that language would entail. Availability and quality of educational opportunities for qualifying relative (and children, if any) in the country of relocation. Availability and quality of job training, including technical or vocational opportunities, for qualifying relative (and children, if any) in the country of relocation. Economic Impact Economic impact of applicant’s departure on
IMMIGRATION LAWS
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) The INA is a main source of immigration law in the United States. It contains many of the most important provisions of law relevant to immigration proceedings. Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 8 of the CFR codifies the INA and includes regulations followed by the Department of Homeland Security and EOIR. The regulations cover practice and procedure in immigration proceedings. The Board of Immigration Appeals Board of Immigration Appeals case law precedent.
REFERENCE
REFERENCES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE —EOIR APPENDICES • Appendix B – Org Chart • Appendix C – Deadlines • Appendix D – Forms • Appendix E – Cover Pages • Appendix F – Cert. of Service • Appendix G – Cert. of Translation • Appendix H – Hotlines • Appendix I – Citations • Appendix J – Filing Motions • Appendix K – Ex. Pleading • Appendix L – Ex. Oral Pleading • Appendix M – Ex. Crm. History • Appendix N – Ex. Table of Contents All EOIR Forms Additional Appendices Here Immigration Court Practice Manual www.justice.gov USCIS Policy Manual USCIS POLICY MANUAL POLICY & PROCEDURE Immigration Court Practice Manual ……………………………………………………  PDF USCIS Policy Manual …………………………………………………………………………..   Online Version or PDF US Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual……………..……….….. Ch. 7  &  Ch. 9 USCIS Memorandum   ————————-———————————> Wiki
SIJS LEGAL AUTHORITY
ALL LEGAL AUTHORITIES INA 101(a)(27)(J)  SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE DEFINITION (J) an immigrant who is present in the United States- (i) who has been declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States or whom such a court has legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a State, or an individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court located in the United States, and whose reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law; (ii) for whom it has been determined in administrative or judicial proceedings that it would not be in the alien’s best interest to be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence; and (iii) in whose case the Secretary of Homeland Security consents to the grant of special immigrant juvenile status, except that- (I) no juvenile court has jurisdiction to determine the custody status or placement of an alien in the custody of the Secretary of Health and Human Services unless the Secretary of Health and Human Services specifically consents to such jurisdiction; and (II) no natural parent or prior adoptive parent of any alien provided special immigrant status under this subparagraph shall thereafter, by virtue of such parentage, be accorded any right, privilege, or status under this chapter; 8 CFR 204.11  Special immigrant juvenile classification § 204.11 Special immigrant juvenile classification. (a) Definitions. As used in this section, the following definitions apply to a request for classification as a special immigrant juvenile. Judicial determination means a conclusion of law made by a juvenile court. Juvenile court means a court located in the United States that has jurisdiction under State law to make judicial determinations about the dependency and/or custody and care of juveniles. Petition means the form designated by USCIS to request classification as a special immigrant juvenile and the act of filing the request. Petitioner means the alien seeking special immigrant juvenile classification. State means the definition set out in section 101(a)(36) of the Act, including an Indian tribe, tribal organization, or tribal consortium, operating a program under a plan approved under 42 U.S.C. 671. United States means the definition set out in section 101(a)(38) of the Act. (b) Eligibility. A petitioner is eligible for classification as a special immigrant juvenile under section 203(b)(4) of the Act as described at section 101(a)(27)(J) of the Act, if they meet all of the following requirements: (1) Is under 21 years of age at the time of filing the petition; (2) Is unmarried at the time of filing and adjudication; (3) Is physically present in the United States; (4) Is the subject of a juvenile court order(s) that meets the requirements under paragraph (c) of this section; and (5) Obtains consent from the Secretary of Homeland Security to classification as a special immigrant juvenile. For USCIS to consent, the request for SIJ classification must be bona fide, which requires the petitioner to establish that a primary reason the required juvenile court determinations were sought was to obtain relief from parental abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis under State law. USCIS may withhold consent if evidence materially conflicts with the eligibility requirements in paragraph (b) of this section such that the record reflects that the request for SIJ classification was not bona fide. USCIS approval of the petition constitutes the granting of consent. (c) Juvenile court order(s) — (1) Court-ordered dependency or custody and parental reunification determination. The juvenile court must have made certain judicial determinations related to the petitioner’s custody or dependency and determined that the petitioner cannot reunify with their parent(s) due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis under State law. (i) The juvenile court must have made at least one of the following judicial determinations related to the petitioner’s custodial placement or dependency in accordance with State law governing such determinations: (A) Declared the petitioner dependent upon the juvenile court; or (B) Legally committed to or placed the petitioner under the custody of an agency or department of a State, or an individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court. (ii) The juvenile court must have made a judicial determination that parental reunification with one or both parents is not viable due to abuse, abandonment, neglect, or a similar basis under State law. The court is not required to terminate parental rights to determine that parental reunification is not viable. (2) Best interest determination. (i) A determination must be made in judicial or administrative proceedings by a court or agency recognized by the juvenile court and authorized by law to make such decisions that it would not be in the petitioner’s best interest to be returned to the petitioner’s or their parent’s country of nationality or last habitual residence. (ii) Nothing in this part should be construed as altering the standards for best interest determinations that juvenile court judges routinely apply under relevant State law. (3) Qualifying juvenile court order(s). (i) The juvenile court must have exercised its authority over the petitioner as a juvenile and made the requisite judicial determinations in this paragraph under applicable State law to establish eligibility. (ii) The juvenile court order(s) must be in effect on the date the petitioner files the petition and continue through the time of adjudication of the petition, except when the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over the petitioner terminated solely because: (A) The petitioner was adopted, placed in a permanent guardianship, or another child welfare permanency goal was reached, other than reunification with a parent or parents with whom the court previously found that reunification was not viable; or (B) The petitioner was the subject of a qualifying juvenile court order that was terminated based on age, provided the petitioner was under 21 years of age at the time of filing the petition. (d) Petition requirements. A petitioner must submit all of the following evidence, as applicable to their petition: (1) Petition. A petition by or on behalf of a juvenile, filed on the form prescribed by USCIS in accordance with

Sub Categories

ADMISSION
BIA CASE LAW REGARDING ADMISSIONS Matter of Chavez-Alvarez, 26 I&N Dec. 274 (BIA 2014) (1) Adjustment of status constitutes an “admission” for purposes of determining an alien’s removability under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012), as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony “at any time after admission.” Matter of Rosas, 22 I&N Dec. 616 (BIA 1999), reaffirmed. (2) An element listed in a specification in the Manual for Courts-Martial (“MCM”), which must be pled and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, is the functional equivalent of an “element” of a criminal offense for immigration purposes. (3) The crime of sodomy by force in violation of article 125 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 925 (2000), and the Punitive Articles of the MCM relating to sodomy, is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2012) within the definition of an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)(2012). Matter of Koljenovic, 25 I&N Dec. 219 (BIA 2010) An alien who entered the United States without inspection and later obtained lawful permanent resident status through adjustment of status has “previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence” and must therefore satisfy the 7-year continuous residence requirement of section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2006), to be eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility. Matter of Quilantan, 25 I&N Dec. 285 (BIA 2010) For purposes of establishing eligibility for adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2006), an alien seeking to show that he or she has been “admitted” to the United States pursuant to section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2006), need only prove procedural regularity in his or her entry, which does not require the alien to be questioned by immigration authorities or be admitted in a particular status. Matter of Areguillin, 17 I&N Dec. 308 (BIA 1980), reaffirmed.
AGGRAVATED FELONIES (CASE LAW)
AGGRAVATED FELONIES BIA CASE LAW Accessory After the Fact Matter of Batista, 21 I&N Dec. 955 (BIA 1997) (1) The offense of accessory after the fact to a drug-trafficking crime, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3 (Supp. V 1993), is not considered an inchoate crime and is not sufficiently related to a controlled substance violation to support a finding of deportability pursuant to section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(B)(i) (1994). (2) The respondent’s conviction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3 establishes his deportability as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony under section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act,because the offense of accessory after the fact falls within the definition of an obstruction of justice crime under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.A. §1101(a)(43)(S) (West Supp. 1997), and because the respondent’s sentence, regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution of that sentence, “is at least one year.” Alien Smuggling Matter of Alvarado-Alvino, 22 I&N Dec. 718 (BIA 1999) An alien convicted of an offense described in section 275(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (Supp. II 1996), is not convicted of an aggravated felony as that term is defined in section 101(a)(43)(N) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(N) (Supp. II 1996), which specifically refers to those offenses relating to alien smuggling described in sections 274(a)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act, 8U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) and (2) (Supp. II 1996). Arson Matter of Bautista, 25 I&N Dec. 616 (BIA 2011) Attempted arson in the third degree in violation of sections 110 and 150.10 of the New York Penal Law is an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(E)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(E)(i) (2006), even though the State crime lacks the jurisdictional element in the applicable Federal arson offense. Matter of Vasquez-Muniz, 23 I&N Dec. 207 (BIA 2002), followed. Matter of Palacios, 22 I&N Dec. 434 (BIA 1998) An alien who was convicted of arson in the first degree under the law of Alaska and sentenced to 7 years’ imprisonment with 3 years suspended was convicted of a “crime of violence” within the meaning of section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(F) (Supp. II 1996), and therefore is deportable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (Supp. II 1996), as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony. Burglary Matter of Perez, 22 I&N Dec. 1325 (BIA 2000) (Burglary of a Vehicle) The offense of burglary of a vehicle in violation of section 30.04(a) of the Texas Penal Code Annotated is not a “burglary offense” within the definition of an aggravated felony in section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(G) (Supp. IV 1998). Commercial Bribery Matter of Gruenangerl, 25 I&N Dec. 351 (BIA 2010) The crime of bribery of a public official in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(A) (2006) is not an offense “relating to” commercial bribery and is therefore not an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(R) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R) (2006). Conspiracy Matter of Richardson, 25 I&N Dec. 226 (BIA 2010) (1) The term “conspiracy” in section 101(a)(43)(U) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U) (2006), is not limited to conspiracies that require the commission of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy by one of the conspirators. (2) An alien who was only convicted of conspiracy to commit an aggravated felony and is removable on the basis of that conviction under section 101(a)(43)(U) of the Act may not also be found removable for the underlying substantive offense, even though the record of conviction shows that the conspirators actually committed the substantive offense. Controlled Substances Matter of Ferreira, 26 I&N Dec. 415 (BIA 2014) Where a State statute on its face covers a controlled substance not included in the Federal controlled substances schedules, there must be a realistic probability that the State would prosecute conduct under the statute that falls outside the generic definition of the removable offense to defeat a charge of removability under the categorical approach. Matter of L-G-H-, 26 I&N Dec. 365 (BIA 2014) Sale of a controlled substance in violation of section 893.13(1)(a)(1) of the Florida Statutes, which lacks a mens rea element with respect to the illicit nature of the substance but requires knowledge of its presence and includes an affirmative defense for ignorance of its unlawful nature, is an “illicit trafficking” aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2012). Matter of Flores, 26 I&N Dec. 155 (BIA 2013) The offense of traveling in interstate commerce with the intent to distribute the proceeds of an unlawful drug enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(1)(A) (2006) is not an “aggravated felony” under section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2006), because it is neither a “drug trafficking crime” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006) nor “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance.” Matter of Davis, 20 I&N Dec. 536 (BIA 1992), followed. Matter of Castro-Rodriguez, 25 I&N Dec. 698 (BIA 2012) An alien convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute under State law has the burden to show that the offense is not an aggravated felony because it involved a “small amount of marihuana for no remuneration” within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(4) (2006), which the alien may establish by presenting evidence outside of the record of conviction. Matter of Aruna, 24 I&N Dec. 452 (BIA 2008), clarified. Matter of Sanchez-Cornejo, 25 I&N Dec. 273 (BIA 2010) The offense of delivery of a simulated controlled substance in violation of Texas law is not an aggravated felony, as defined by section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2006), but it is a violation of a law relating to a controlled substance under former section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(B)(i) (1994). Matter of Aruna, 24 I&N Dec. 452 (BIA 2008) Absent
ARRIVING ALIEN (CASE LAW)
Arriving Alien BIA Cases Matter of Gonzalez Romo, 26 I&N Dec. 743 (BIA 2016) Within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, a returning lawful permanent resident who has a felony conviction for solicitation to possess marijuana for sale is inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2012), even though that section refers only to attempt and conspiracy to commit a crime involving moral turpitude, and is therefore properly considered to be an arriving alien under section 101(a)(13)(C)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) (2012). Matter of Vo, 25 I&N Dec. 426 (BIA 2011), clarified. Matter of E-R-M- & L-R-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 520 (BIA 2011) (1) Section 235(b)(1)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2006), does not limit the prosecutorial discretion of the Department of Homeland Security to place arriving aliens in removal proceedings under section 240 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006). (2) The fact that an Immigration Judge has no jurisdiction over applications for adjustment of status under the Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of November 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161, as amended, does not negate his or her jurisdiction over the removal proceedings of arriving Cuban aliens under section 240 of the Act. Matter of Oseiwusu, 22 I&N Dec. 19 (BIA 1998) (1) An alien who arrives in the United States pursuant to a grant of advance parole is an “arriving alien,” as that term is defined in the federal regulations. (2) According to the regulations, an Immigration Judge has no authority over the apprehension, custody, and detention of arriving aliens and is therefore without authority to consider the bond request of an alien returning pursuant to a grant of advance parole. Matter of R-D-, 24 I&N Dec. 221 (BIA 2007) (1) An alien who leaves the United States and is admitted to Canada to seek refugee status has made a departure from the United States. (2) An alien returning to the United States after the denial of an application for refugee status in Canada is seeking admission into the United States and is therefore an arriving alien under 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(q) (2007).
Convicted of Two Crimes of Moral Turpitude (CIMT)
Section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii),provides: “Any alien who at any time after admission is convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, regardless of whether confined therefor and regardless of whether the convictions were in a single trial, is deportable.” INA §237(a)(2)(A)(ii) [full statute] When are two convictions arising out of a single scheme? See article on “arising out of a single scheme“.
CONVICTION FOR SELLING FAKE DRUGS
A conviction for selling a simulated controlled substance that was not actually a controlled substance is not an offense relating to a controlled substance under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i). Matter of Sanchez-Cornejo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 273 (BIA 2010). INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i) – Offense “Relating To” a Controlled Substance Any alien who at time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802), other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of thirty grams or less of marijuana is deportable. Matter of Sanchez-Cornejo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 273 (BIA 2010) Texas conviction of delivery of a simulated controlled substance, as defined by 482.001(4) of the Texas Health and Safety Code, is not an aggravated felony drug trafficking offense because federal law does not punish distribution of a non-controlled substance in place of a real controlled substance; the violation is, however, a controlled substances offense for purposes of triggering removability under INA 237(a)(2)(B). For NY Controlled Substance Convictions the sale of actual controlled substances may not be a crime related to a controlled substance. See U.S. v. Minter, No. 21-3102 (2d Cir. 2023).
IMMIGRATION LAWS
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) The INA is a main source of immigration law in the United States. It contains many of the most important provisions of law relevant to immigration proceedings. Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 8 of the CFR codifies the INA and includes regulations followed by the Department of Homeland Security and EOIR. The regulations cover practice and procedure in immigration proceedings. The Board of Immigration Appeals Board of Immigration Appeals case law precedent.
INA 236 PAROLE NOT ELIGIBLE FOR AOS
As the Board explained in its decision in Matter of Castillo-Padilla, 25 I&N Dec. 257, 258–63 (BIA 2010), a release on conditional parole under section 236(a)(2)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(B) (2018)) is legally distinct from humanitarian parole under INA §212(d)(5). In the 2023 decision, Matter of Cabrera Fernandez, 28 I&N Dec. 747 (BIA 2023), the Board took that further and confirmed that conditional parole under INA §236(a)(2)(B) is not a parole for purposes of adjustment of status. INA 236(a)(2)(B) Parole does not count as a parole for purposes of Adjustment of Status MATTER OF CABRERA-FERNANDEZ Matter of Olty CABRERA-FERNANDEZ, 28 I&N Dec. 747 (BIA 2023) (1) Release on conditional parole under section 236(a)(2)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(B) (2018), is legally distinct from release on humanitarian parole under section 212(d)(5)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (2018). Matter of Castillo-Padilla, 25 I&N Dec. 257, 258–63 (BIA 2010), followed. (2) Applicants for admission who are released on conditional parole rather than humanitarian parole have not been “inspected and admitted or paroled,” and accordingly are not eligible for adjustment of status under the Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of November 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161, as amended.
Judicial Review
INS v. St. Cyr 一 The Suspension Clause of the Constitution, which protects the privilege of the habeas corpus writ, requires some judicial intervention in deportation cases. Habeas courts have answered questions of law in challenges to executive interpretations of immigration law and questions of law arising in the discretionary relief context. Papageorgiou v. Gonzales 一 The REAL ID Act permits all foreign nationals, including those with criminal convictions, to obtain review of constitutional claims and questions of law upon filing a petition for review of a final removal order with an appropriate court of appeals. However, due process challenges to summary BIA affirmances of removal orders lack merit. Enwonwu v. Chertoff 一 By adjusting the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, Congress can effectively strip disfavored classes from full access to justice and thereby restrict or extinguish individual rights and liberties.
Matter of Azrag, 28 I&N Dec. 784 (BIA 2024)
Matter of Mogtabi Hassan AZRAG, 28 I&N Dec. 784 (BIA 2024) February 23, 2024 the Board of Immigration Appeals issued a precedential decision regarding the circumstances under which a State Court vacates a conviction, which is extremely similar to this exact issue. The Board addressed whether the State’s vacatur would be recognized for immigration purposes. See Matter of Azrag, 28 I&N Dec. 784 (BIA 2024). In that case a noncitizen in Kansas was convicted of a removable offense. The State of Kansas ended up vacating that criminal conviction and allowing him to plea to a lower charge that, if recognized for immigration purposes, would defeat the charges of removability and allow him to keep his legal permanent resident status.     The Board found insufficient evidence in the record to determine that the convictions were vacated because of a defect in his criminal proceedings (that is, the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel). The general rule with state court vacaturs is that they are recognized for immigration purposes when they are related to a substantive or procedural defect in the underlying proceedings; they are not recognized when they are done for purely rehabilitative purposes, such as to avoid immigration consequences. The Clean Slate Act does not vacate convictions, rather seals them, but it does so for rehabilitative purposes. The records are sealed after a set period of years upon showing rehabilitation. It has nothing to do with any defect in the underlying court proceedings or the law, so it would never be recognized for immigration purposes pursuant to Matter of Azrag, 28 I&N Dec. 784 (BIA 2024). If your conviction is vacated because of legal reasons relating to the underlying case then immigration will recognize that but cases that are disposed of for rehabilitation alone will remain as convictions will full force and effect. Full Decision.
Matter of R-T-P-, 28 I&N Dec. 828 (BIA 2024)
Matter of R-T-P-, 28 I&N Dec. 828 (BIA 2024) (1) A proper remedy for a violation of the claim-processing rule at section 239(a)(1)(G)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i) (2018), should (1) result in a notice to appear as a single document; (2) be consistent with the rules governing the procedures used for remedy; (3) help to promote the underlying purpose of claim-processing rules generally and the rule that the notice to appear include the time and place of the hearing in particular; and (4) not prejudice the respondent. (2) Written amendments made by an Immigration Judge, upon the motion of the Department of Homeland Security, to the time and place of the hearing on the notice to appear may satisfy the requirements for a proper remedy to a noncompliant notice to appear. Full Decision. Defects in the Notice to Appear & Remedies This decision finds that an Immigration Judge may remedy a defective Notice to Appear by making handwritten amendments to it in Court when requested to do so by the Department of Homeland Security. A Respondent can object to an NTA for being defective up until the time that pleadings are completed.  Matter of Fernandes, 28 I&N Dec. 605 (BIA 2022). However, such an objection will not have much effect after this decision if the Immigration Judge may simply remedy the defect and proceed with the case. This decision is an anti-climatic conclusion to a string of cases relating to defective NTA’s. In 2021, the Supreme Court held that an NTA that lacks the time and place of the initial hearing before the IJ was not remedied by a subsequent notice of hearing. Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155 (2021). Following Niz-Chavez, the BIA issued Matter of Fernandes, 28 I&N Dec. 605 (BIA 2022). In Matter of Fernandes, the BIA found that IJs may allow DHS to remedy a deficient NTA without ordering termination. However, the decision failed to specify exactly how DHS might remedy a deficient NTA. In Matter of Aguilar Hernandez, the BIA found that DHS could not remedy a deficient NTA by filing Form I-261. Matter of Aguilar Hernandez, 28 I&N Dec. 774 (BIA 2024). Most recently, the Supreme Court in Campos-Chaves v. Garland held that a respondent served with a noncompliant NTA may still be ordered removed in absentia under INA section 240(b)(5)(A), if the respondent received a notice of hearing under INA section 239(a)(2) and subsequently failed to appear at the hearing. Campos-Chaves v. Garland, 144 S. Ct. 1637, 1647 (2024).
NY CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE OFFENSES
The Second Circuit has found that NY defines narcotic in a way that is overbroad and includes substances that are not on the federally controlled substance schedules and therefore, under the categorical approach, are not controlled substance offenses. U.S. v. Minter, No. 21-3102 (2d Cir. 2023) The issue on appeal is whether Defendant’s 2014 conviction under New York Penal Law Section 220.39(1) for the sale of cocaine was for a “serious drug offense” and therefore qualifies as a predicate offense for the purposes of a sentencing enhancement under the ACCA. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that New York’s definition of cocaine is categorically broader than its federal counterpart, thus, Defendant’s cocaine conviction cannot serve as a predicate ACCA offense. The government argued that under Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez, that even if the New York definition of cocaine is broadly construed to criminalize all its isomers, Minter must show a “realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,” that New York’s statute is broader in practice. The court explained that here, the New York statute applies on its face to all cocaine isomers; the CSA does not. In citing Hylton, the court wrote, “When the state law is facially overbroad, we look no further.” NOTE: Reason to believe charges do not require a conviction. See reason to believe. NY Penal Law § 220.39: Criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree There are several offenses prohibiting selling drugs in the New York Penal Code. Most require that you sell or attempt to sell a minimum amount of specific types of drugs in order to be prosecuted. You will have committed the crime of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree under New York Penal Code § 220.39 if you knowingly and unlawfully sell drugs as follows: In addition you could be prosecuted for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree if you sell narcotics to someone who is under the age of 21, or you sell a stimulant, hallucinogen, hallucinogenic substance, or lysergic acid diethylamide and you previously have been convicted of a drug offense.
RETURNING LPR
Returning Lawful Permanent Resident BIA CASE LAW Matter of Pena, 26 I&N Dec. 613 (BIA 2015) An alien returning to the United States who has been granted lawful permanent resident status cannot be regarded as seeking an admission and may not be charged with inadmissibility under section 212(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2012), if he or she does not fall within any of the exceptions in section 101(a)(13)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) (2012). Matter of Koloamatangi, 23 I&N Dec. 548 (BIA 2003), distinguished. Matter of Valanzuela-Felix, 26 I&N Dec. 53 (BIA 2012) When the Department of Homeland Security paroles a returning lawful permanent resident for prosecution, it need not have all the evidence to sustain its burden of proving that the alien is an applicant for admission but may ordinarily rely on the results of a subsequent prosecution to meet that burden in later removal proceedings. Matter of Rivens, 25 I&N Dec. 623 (BIA 2011) (1) In order to establish that a returning lawful permanent resident alien is to be treated as an applicant for admission to the United States, the Department of Homeland Security has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that one of the six exceptions to the general rule for lawful permanent residents set forth at section 101(a)(13)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) (2006), applies. (2) The offense of accessory after the fact is a crime involving moral turpitude, but only if the underlying offense is such a crime. Matter of Collado, 21 I&N Dec. 1061 (BIA 1998) (1) A lawful permanent resident of the United States described in sections 101(a)(13)(C)(I)-(vi) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(i)-(vi)) is to be regarded as “seeking an admission into the United States for purposes of the immigration laws,” without further inquiry into the nature and circumstances of a departure from and return to this country. (2) The Immigration Judge erred in finding that theFleuti doctrine, first enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963), requires the admission into the United States of a returning lawful permanent resident alien who falls within the definition of section 101(a)(13)(C)(v) of the Act, if that alien’s departure from the United States was “brief, casual, and innocent.”
SINGLE OFFENSE EXCEPTION
SINGLE MARIJUANA OFFENSE EXCEPTION Exception for single conviction for marijuana under 30 grams. INA 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006). For purposes of INA 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006), the phrase a single offense involving possession for ones own use of thirty grams or less of marijuana calls for a circumstance-specific inquiry; a respondent convicted of more than one marijuana-related offense arising out of the same underlying facts may still meet the single offense exception. See Matter of Davey, 26 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2012). Matter of Davey, 26 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2012) Arizona convictions of possession of marijuana, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Statute 13-3405(A)(1), and possession of drug paraphernalia (the plastic bag in which the marijuana was contained), Ariz. Rev. Statute 13-3415(A), constituted a single offense involving a small quantity of marijuana, under INA 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), since Congress meant offense in this statute to refer to the totality of an aliens specific acts on a single occasion, so the exception is available to a noncitizen convicted of more than one statutory offense, provided that each crime involved a single incident in which the alien possessed a small amount of marijuana for personal use.); following the reasoning of Matter of Martinez-Espinoza, 25 I&N Dec. 118, 124 (BIA 2009) (we concluded that the term offense used in [INA] section 212(h) was best understood as refer[ring] to the specific unlawful acts that made the alien inadmissible, rather than to any generic crime.).
What Circuit's Case Law is Controlling?
The Circuit Court with jurisdiction over the geographical location of the Immigration Court will control. See Matter of Garcia, 28 I&N Dec. 693 (BIA 2023). For choice of law purposes, the controlling circuit law in Immigration Court proceedings is the law governing the geographic location of the Immigration Court where venue lies, namely where jurisdiction vests and proceedings commence upon the filing of a charging document, and will only change if an Immigration Judge subsequently grants a change of venue to another Immigration Court. Matter of R-C-R-, 28 I&N Dec. 74 (BIA 2020), clarified.
USCIS Provides Policy Update Regarding Acquisition of Citizenship Provisions
July 18, 2024, USCIS published a Policy Alert (PA-2024-21), with information about changes made to the USCIS Policy Manual in regards to the agency’s interpretation of Acquired Citizenship provisions for children. HIGHLIGHTS Summary of Changes Affected Section: Volume 12 > Part H > Chapter 1, Purpose and Background SOURCE: Volume 12: Citizenship and Naturalization, Part H, Children of U.S. Citizens [12 USCIS-PM H] (Chapters 1-6).
EOIR Final Rule on Administrative Closure and Termination
On July 29, 2024, a new Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) Final Rule, Efficient Case and Docket Management in Immigration Proceedings, went into effect. The rule codifies the authority of immigration judges (IJ) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to administratively close and terminate removal proceedings. The new rule can be found in its entirety in the Federal Register available online at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-05-29/pdf/2024-11121.pdf. The rule includes three major changes: (1) Immigration Judges’ Authority to Administratively Close Proceedings; (2)the authority for an Immigration Judge to terminate proceedings in their discretion and sets forth the factors that should be considered in those circumstances; (3) Rules for Retroactive Application of Law for Post Conviction Relief; (4) The Rule Restores Important Procedural Safeguards That the Trump Rule Had Eliminated; (5) The Rule Gives the BIA Expanded Authority to Grant Voluntary Departure Rather than Remand; and (6) Changes some language to be more appropriate. 1. Immigration Judges’ Authority to Administratively Close Proceedings The Final Rule codifies IJs’ and the BIA’s administrative closure authority and provides a list of factors for deciding whether to administratively close a case or recalendar a previously administratively closed case. 8 CFR §§ 1003.18(c); 1003.1(l). The rule generally mandates administrative closure if based on a joint motion or a motion led by one party where the other party “has affirmatively indicated its non-opposition.” 8 CFR §§ 1003.18(c)(3); 1003.1(l)(3). In all other situations, the IJs and the BIA may grant administrative closure orrecalendar a case if they deem it warranted, even if a party opposes. However, IJs and the BIA must consider the “totality of the circumstances” including the following non-exclusive factor (A) The reason administrative closure is sought;(B) The basis for any opposition to administrative closure;(C) Any requirement that a case be administratively closed in order for a petition,application, or other action to be led with, or granted by, DHS;(D) The likelihood the noncitizen will succeed on any petition, application, or otheraction that the noncitizen is pursuing, or that the noncitizen states in writing or onthe record at a hearing that they plan to pursue, outside of proceedings before;(E) The anticipated duration of the administrative closure;(F) The responsibility of either party, if any, in contributing to any current or anticipated delay;(G) The ultimate anticipated outcome of the case pending before; and(H) The ICE detention status of the noncitizen.” Codified at 8 CFR §§ 1003.18(c)(3)(i); 1003.1(l)(3)(i). The regulation also species that a noncitizen does not need to have an action pending outside of EOIR proceedings to present an appropriate case for administrative closure. 8 CFR §§ 1003.18(c)(3); 1003.1(l)(3). The Final Rule is nearly identical to identical to the proposed rule, with the addition of the noncitizen’sICE detention status as an administrative closure factor. Many of the factors listed in the rule are similar to those previously outlined in leading BIA administrative closure cases, see Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012); Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. 17 (BIA 2017), but motions for administrative closure filed now should be sure to cite to the new regulation. The Board’s holding in Matter of W–Y–U– that ‘‘the primary consideration . . . in determining whether to administratively close or recalendar proceedings is whether the party opposing administrative closure has provided a persuasive reason for the case to proceed and be resolved on the merits,’’ id., is inconsistent with the unweighted, ‘‘totality-of-the-circumstances’’ standard implemented by this rule, Matter of W–Y–U–, 27 I&N Dec. 17, is superseded.”). See 89 Fed. Reg. at 46753. 2. Codifying Immigration Judges’ Authority to Terminate Proceedings in Their Discretion 8 CFR § 1239.2(b) ORDERING TERMINATION OR DISMISSAL (b) Ordering termination or dismissal. After commencement of proceedings, an immigration judge or Board member shall have authority to resolve or dispose of a case through an order of dismissal or an order of termination. An immigration judge or Board member may enter an order of dismissal in cases where DHS moves for dismissal pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section. A motion to dismiss removal proceedings for a reason other than those authorized by paragraph (c) of this section shall be deemed a motion to terminate and adjudicated pursuant to 8 CFR 1003.1(m), pertaining to cases before the Board, or 8 CFR 1003.18(d), pertaining to cases before the immigration court, as applicable. 8 CFR 1003.1(m) TERMINATION Mandatory Termination Under the mandatory termination category, IJs and the BIA are required to terminate proceedings if any of the below circumstances are present: ▹ The removal charge(s) cannot be sustained;▹ Termination is otherwise required by law;▹ Fundamentally fair proceedings are not possible because the noncitizen is mentallyincompetent and adequate safeguards are unavailable;▹ The noncitizen obtained U.S. citizenship after removal proceedings started;▹ The noncitizen has obtained one of the following statuses and would not have beenremovable as charged if they had obtained such status before the initiation ofproceedings: LPR status, refugee status, asylee status, U nonimmigrant status, Tnonimmigrant status, or S nonimmigrant status;▹ The noncitizen meets the regulatory standard for termination after NACARAadjustment, see 8 CFR § 1245.13(l); or▹ The parties led a joint motion to terminate, or “one party led a motion to terminate and the other party affirmatively indicated its non-opposition, unless the [IJ] articulates unusual, clearly identified, and supported reasons for denying the motion.” Codified at 8 CFR §§ 1003.18(d)(1)(i); 1003.1(m)(1)(i). Discretionary termination In removal, deportation, or exclusion proceedings, the Board may, in the exercise of discretion, terminate the case upon the motion of a party where at least one of the requirements listed in paragraphs (m)(1)(ii)(A) through (F) of this section is met. The Board shall consider the reason termination is sought and the basis for any opposition to termination when adjudicating the motion to terminate. (A) The noncitizen has filed an asylum application with USCIS pursuant to section 208(b)(3)(C) of the Act pertaining to unaccompanied children, as defined in 8 CFR 1001.1(hh). (B) The noncitizen is prima facie eligible for naturalization, relief from removal, or a lawful status; USCIS has jurisdiction to adjudicate the associated petition, application,
SIJS LEGAL AUTHORITY
ALL LEGAL AUTHORITIES INA 101(a)(27)(J)  SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE DEFINITION (J) an immigrant who is present in the United States- (i) who has been declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States or whom such a court has legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a State, or an individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court located in the United States, and whose reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law; (ii) for whom it has been determined in administrative or judicial proceedings that it would not be in the alien’s best interest to be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence; and (iii) in whose case the Secretary of Homeland Security consents to the grant of special immigrant juvenile status, except that- (I) no juvenile court has jurisdiction to determine the custody status or placement of an alien in the custody of the Secretary of Health and Human Services unless the Secretary of Health and Human Services specifically consents to such jurisdiction; and (II) no natural parent or prior adoptive parent of any alien provided special immigrant status under this subparagraph shall thereafter, by virtue of such parentage, be accorded any right, privilege, or status under this chapter; 8 CFR 204.11  Special immigrant juvenile classification § 204.11 Special immigrant juvenile classification. (a) Definitions. As used in this section, the following definitions apply to a request for classification as a special immigrant juvenile. Judicial determination means a conclusion of law made by a juvenile court. Juvenile court means a court located in the United States that has jurisdiction under State law to make judicial determinations about the dependency and/or custody and care of juveniles. Petition means the form designated by USCIS to request classification as a special immigrant juvenile and the act of filing the request. Petitioner means the alien seeking special immigrant juvenile classification. State means the definition set out in section 101(a)(36) of the Act, including an Indian tribe, tribal organization, or tribal consortium, operating a program under a plan approved under 42 U.S.C. 671. United States means the definition set out in section 101(a)(38) of the Act. (b) Eligibility. A petitioner is eligible for classification as a special immigrant juvenile under section 203(b)(4) of the Act as described at section 101(a)(27)(J) of the Act, if they meet all of the following requirements: (1) Is under 21 years of age at the time of filing the petition; (2) Is unmarried at the time of filing and adjudication; (3) Is physically present in the United States; (4) Is the subject of a juvenile court order(s) that meets the requirements under paragraph (c) of this section; and (5) Obtains consent from the Secretary of Homeland Security to classification as a special immigrant juvenile. For USCIS to consent, the request for SIJ classification must be bona fide, which requires the petitioner to establish that a primary reason the required juvenile court determinations were sought was to obtain relief from parental abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis under State law. USCIS may withhold consent if evidence materially conflicts with the eligibility requirements in paragraph (b) of this section such that the record reflects that the request for SIJ classification was not bona fide. USCIS approval of the petition constitutes the granting of consent. (c) Juvenile court order(s) — (1) Court-ordered dependency or custody and parental reunification determination. The juvenile court must have made certain judicial determinations related to the petitioner’s custody or dependency and determined that the petitioner cannot reunify with their parent(s) due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis under State law. (i) The juvenile court must have made at least one of the following judicial determinations related to the petitioner’s custodial placement or dependency in accordance with State law governing such determinations: (A) Declared the petitioner dependent upon the juvenile court; or (B) Legally committed to or placed the petitioner under the custody of an agency or department of a State, or an individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court. (ii) The juvenile court must have made a judicial determination that parental reunification with one or both parents is not viable due to abuse, abandonment, neglect, or a similar basis under State law. The court is not required to terminate parental rights to determine that parental reunification is not viable. (2) Best interest determination. (i) A determination must be made in judicial or administrative proceedings by a court or agency recognized by the juvenile court and authorized by law to make such decisions that it would not be in the petitioner’s best interest to be returned to the petitioner’s or their parent’s country of nationality or last habitual residence. (ii) Nothing in this part should be construed as altering the standards for best interest determinations that juvenile court judges routinely apply under relevant State law. (3) Qualifying juvenile court order(s). (i) The juvenile court must have exercised its authority over the petitioner as a juvenile and made the requisite judicial determinations in this paragraph under applicable State law to establish eligibility. (ii) The juvenile court order(s) must be in effect on the date the petitioner files the petition and continue through the time of adjudication of the petition, except when the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over the petitioner terminated solely because: (A) The petitioner was adopted, placed in a permanent guardianship, or another child welfare permanency goal was reached, other than reunification with a parent or parents with whom the court previously found that reunification was not viable; or (B) The petitioner was the subject of a qualifying juvenile court order that was terminated based on age, provided the petitioner was under 21 years of age at the time of filing the petition. (d) Petition requirements. A petitioner must submit all of the following evidence, as applicable to their petition: (1) Petition. A petition by or on behalf of a juvenile, filed on the form prescribed by USCIS in accordance with