Immigration Law Wiki
Tag - court
Articles
An in absentia order is an order that is entered by the Judge in your absence (in absentia). If you are not present in Court the Judge may enter an order against you if she believes that you were given proper notice of the hearing and should have been there. If this happens you can file a motion to reopen the case. Typically such a motion much be filed within 180 days according to the regulations but there is an exception if it was an in absentia order and the reason you were not there was because you did not receive notice of the hearing i.e. no one informed you that you had a hearing that day. If you missed your hearing and you are trying to file a motion to reopen pro se (without a lawyer) then you should read this article about filing a motion to reopen pro se and take a look at the EOIR template MTRO for non-represented respondents. You should also read the blog post, What if I Missed my Hearing and Was Ordered Removed. This article contains the Regulations, Statutes, Court Rules, and Case Law relating to Motions to Reopen In Absentia Orders. REGULATIONS 8 CFR § 1003.23 8 CFR § 1003.23 – Reopening or reconsideration before the immigration court 8 CFR §1003.23(b)(4)(iii) (iii) Order entered in absentia in deportation or exclusion proceedings. (A) An order entered in absentia in deportation proceedings may be rescinded only upon a motion to reopen filed: (1) Within 180 days after the date of the order of deportation if the alien demonstrates that the failure to appear was because of exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the alien (e.g., serious illness of the alien or serious illness or death of an immediate relative of the alien, but not including less compelling circumstances); or (2) At any time if the alien demonstrates that he or she did not receive notice or if the alien demonstrates that he or she was in federal or state custody and the failure to appear was through no fault of the alien. STATUTES 8 U.S.C. §1229a(b)(5)(C)(i) In absentia removal order may be rescinded upon a motion to reopen if the noncitizen demonstrates that the failure to appear at the removal hearing was because of “exceptional circumstances.” 8 U.S.C. §1229a(b)(5)(C)(i). That term refers to circumstances beyond the noncitizen’s control, such as “serious illness or death” of the noncitizen’s spouse, child, or parent, but does not include “less compelling circumstances.” 8 U.S.C. §1229a(e)(1). The panel explained that, in making the exceptional circumstances determination, the IJ and BIA must look to the totality of the circumstances and must consider certain relevant factors. INA §240(e)(1) INA §240(e)(1) Exceptional Circumstances beyond the alien’s control INA §240(b)(5)(C)(ii) INA §240(b)(5)(C)(ii) Lack of Notice EOIR Practice Manual https://www.justice.gov/eoir/reference-materials/ic/chapter-5/9 (a) In General — A motion to reopen requesting that an in absentia order be rescinded asks the immigration judge to consider the reasons why the respondent did not appear at the respondent’s scheduled hearing. See Chapter 4.17 (In Absentia Hearing). … **(1) Content — A motion to reopen to rescind an in absentia order must demonstrate that: the failure to appear was because of exceptional circumstances; the failure to appear was because the respondent did not receive proper notice; or the failure to appear was because the respondent was in federal or state custody and the failure to appear was through no fault of the respondent. INA § 240(b)(5)(C), 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii). The term “exceptional circumstances” refers to exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the respondent (such as battery or extreme cruelty to the respondent or any child or parent of the respondent, serious illness of the respondent or serious illness or death of the spouse, child, or parent of the respondent, but not including less compelling circumstances). INA § 240(e)(1). **(2) Time limits — (A) Within 180 days — If the motion to reopen to rescind an in absentia order is based on an allegation that the failure to appear was because of exceptional circumstances, the motion must be filed within 180 days after the in absentia order. See INA § 240(b)(5)(C), 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii). (B) At any time — If the motion to reopen to rescind an in absentia order is based on an allegation that the respondent did not receive proper notice of the hearing, or that the respondent was in federal or state custody and the failure to appear was through no fault of the respondent, the motion may be filed at any time. See INA § 240(b)(5)(C), 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii). (C) Responses — Responses to motions to reopen to rescind in absentia orders are due within ten (10) days after the motion was received by the immigration court, unless otherwise specified by the immigration judge. **(3) Number limits — The respondent is permitted to file only one motion to reopen to rescind an in absentia order. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii). **(4) Automatic stay — The removal of the respondent is automatically stayed pending disposition by the immigration judge of the motion to reopen to rescind an in absentia order in removal proceedings. See INA § 240(b)(5)(C), 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) BIA CASE LAW Matter of Haim, 19 I&N Dec. 641, 642 (BIA 1988) Matter of M-R-A-, 24 I&N Dec. 665 (BIA 2008) Matter of C-R-C-, 24 I&N Dec. 677 (BIA 2008). In determining whether the respondent has overcome this presumption, the immigration judge must consider both circumstantial and corroborating evidence, and may consider a variety of factors, including (but not limited) to: CIRCUIT COURT CASE LAW MONTEJO-GONZALEZ V. GARLAND, No. 21-304 (9th Cir. 2024) A mother and her two minor children, who entered the United States seeking asylum, were scheduled for an initial hearing before an immigration judge (IJ) in Seattle, Washington. On their way to the hearing, they encountered two major car accidents, causing them to be two hours late. Upon arrival, they attempted to have their case heard but were unsuccessful. The IJ ordered them removed in absentia. They promptly moved to reopen the case, arguing that exceptional circumstances justified their late arrival. The Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the IJ and BIA abused
RIGHT TO A FULL & FAIR HEARING An alien who faces removal is entitled to a full and fair removal hearing under both the Act and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Santos-Alvarado v. Barr, 967 F.3d 428, 439 (5th Cir. 2020) (“The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects individuals in removal proceedings.” (citation omitted)); Vetcher v. Barr, 953 F.3d 361, 370 (5th Cir. 2020) (stating that “removal proceedings must be conducted according to standards of fundamental fairness”), petition for cert. filed (U.S. June 26, 2020) (No. 19-1437); Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 474, 479 (BIA 2011) (“Included in the rights that the Due Process Clause requires in removal proceedings is the right to a full and fair hearing.”); see also section 240(b)(4)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2020) (providing that “the alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence against the alien, to present evidence on the alien’s own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government”). ESTABLISHING VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS To establish that due process rights were violated, the respondent must prove that there was a deficiency or violation and that he was prejudiced by it. See Okpala v. Whitaker, 908 F.3d 965, 971 (5th Cir. 2018) (“To prevail on a claim regarding an alleged denial of due process rights, an alien must make an initial showing of substantial prejudice.”); Matter of D-, 20 I&N Dec. 827, 831 (BIA 1994) (per curiam) (noting that an alien has been denied a fair hearing “only if he has been prejudiced by some deficiency so as to deprive him of due process”); Matter of Santos, 19 I&N Dec. 105, 107 (BIA 1984) (stating that “an alien must demonstrate that he has been prejudiced by a violation of a procedural rule or regulation before his deportation proceeding will be invalidated”). The respondent has not shown that his rights were violated or that he suffered prejudice in his removal proceedings. Matter of E-F-H-L-, 26 I&N Dec. 319 (BIA 2014) In Matter of E-F-H-L-, 26 I&N Dec. 319 (BIA 2014) the BIA decided on June 12, 2014 that an alien must have a full and fair hearing, introducing testimony, before an immigration judge could make a decision on his application for asylum, withholding of removal or deferral of removal. The case arose out of a application for asylum before an immigration judge in Texas. In that case, the immigration judge denied the respondent’s applications for asylum and withholding of removal without first holding a individual hearing. Instead, the immigration judge found that the respondent’s written asylum application as submitted to the court and the alien’s pre-hearing brief in support of his petition did not demonstrate the alien’s prima facie (Latin for “first look at” – or “first sight”) for relief. Therefore, simply on the basis of his first impressions, the immigration judge determined that the alien was not entitled to a hearing on the merits of his applications and denied his applications for relief. The Board struck down the immigration judge’s decision. In its holding in E-F-H-L-, the Board referenced its prior holding in Matter of Fefe, 20 I&N Dec., 116 (BIA 1989). The Board held that even though the immigration judge has the authority to control the scope of an evidentiary hearing in the interest of efficiency, such authority must, at a minimum include an opportunity for the applicant to present evidence and witnesses in his or her own behalf. In Matter of Fefe, the Board found that “an essential aspect of the asylum adjudication process” required a full oral examination of the applicant. This was necessary to protect the integrity of the asylum process itself, and provide fairness to the parties. In addition, a 9th Circuit case, Oshodi v. Holder, 729 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc – Latin for “before the entire court”) held that an alien’s fifth amendment due process right to a full and fair hearing was violated when the immigration judge denied relief solely on an adverse credibility finding after refusing to allow the alien to testify to the content of his applications. Under E-F-H-L-, and the prior Board decision in Matter of Fefe, as cited above, any move by the immigration judge to cut short a removal proceeding should be strongly and vigorously questioned and objections placed on the record for appeal. This includes an immigration judge’s decision to deny an applicant a full and fair hearing with presentation of witnesses and evidence, and an opportunity to present the applicant’s story, and be subject to direct and cross examination. The immigration judge cannot simply reject an applicant’s application based on an analysis that the applicant has not made a prima facie case for the relief sought. Such reasoning is in violation of the immigration statute, applicable BIA precedential case law, and contrary to the due process protections in the United States Constitution. VIRTUAL PROCEEDINGS DO NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS The Act and its implementing regulations specifically provide for hearings via video conference. See section 240(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act (providing that a removal “proceeding may take place . . . through video conference”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(c) (2020) (“An Immigration may conduct hearings through video conference to the same extent as he or she may conduct hearings in person.”). This authority has been consistently recognized by the courts of appeals. See Vilchez v. Holder, 682 F.3d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that video conference hearings are explicitly authorized by statute); Aslam v. Mukasey, 537 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (acknowledging that the statutory authority accorded to Immigration Judges to conduct hearings via video conference includes taking the testimony of witnesses); Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 521, 531 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that “Congress specifically authorized proceedings by means of a video conference” and rejecting the alien’s challenge to the constitutionality of the implementing regulation).
Aggravated felonies are defined at 8 USC § 1101(a)(43), which lists dozens of common-law terms and references to federal statutes. Aggravated felonies (“AF”) are the convictions with the most serious immigration consequences for a noncitizen. Noncitizens who have been convicted of an AF are prohibited from receiving most forms of relief from deportation, including asylum, and from being readmitted to the United States at any time in the future. A noncitizen who is convicted of an aggravated felony, deported or removed, and then returns to the U.S. without permission faces a tough federal prison sentence under 8 USC §1326(b)(2). Mandatory Detention for Aggravated Felonies Federal immigration authorities are required to detain any immigrant convicted of an “aggravated felony” upon his or her release from criminal custody. To obtain bond from an immigration judge, LPRs who are detained following a conviction of a potential “aggravated felony” must demonstrate with substantial likelihood that the crime in question does not qualify as an “aggravated felony. Aggravated Felony Bars Relief LPR Cancellation of Removal LPRs who have been convicted of an aggravated felony cannot receive 42A LPR cancellation of removal. Asylum Particularly serious crimes bar asylum relief and a conviction for any aggravated felony is considered a particularly serious crime in asylum determinations, regardless of the term of criminal incarceration. In addition, for purposes of asylum, additional crimes may be defined as “particularly serious crimes” or “serious nonpolitical crimes” by regulation. See 8 USC § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i). Further, courts have held that the Attorney General may designate a specific offense as a “particularly serious crime” through case-by-case adjudication. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(ii). Waivers Certain LPRs may not obtain a waiver of inadmissibility under Section 212(h) of the INA if they were convicted of an AF. A 212(h) waiver can waive criminal offenses that make a noncitizen inadmissible and allow for them to be admitted to the United States. Voluntary Departure An immigrant convicted of an aggravated felony is ineligible for voluntary departure. Voluntary departure is a discretionary form of relief allowing a deportable noncitizen to leave the country at their own expense in place of formal deportation. Permanent Inadmissibility Following Departure from the United States A noncitizen removed from the United States after being convicted of an aggravated felony (or who leaveswhile an order of removal is outstanding) is permanently inadmissible. To lawfully reenter the United States, such an immigrant must receive a special waiver from USCIS, in addition to meeting all other grounds of admissibility. Deportation without a Removal Hearing Certain noncitizens convicted of an aggravated felony are provided fewer legal protections than otherimmigrants. Any noncitizen convicted of an aggravated felony who is not a lawful permanent resident (LPR) may be administratively removed/deported from the United States without a formal hearing before anImmigration Judge. See INA § 238, 8 U.S.C. § 1228. What is an Aggravated Felony Statute – INA § 101(a)(43) (43) The term “aggravated felony” means- (A) murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor; (B) illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21), including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of title 18); See section 802 of Title 21 here. (C) illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices (as defined in section 921 of title 18) or in explosive materials (as defined in section 841(c) of that title); (D) an offense described in section 1956 of title 18 (relating to laundering of monetary instruments) or section 1957 of that title (relating to engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specific unlawful activity) if the amount of the funds exceeded $10,000; (E) an offense described in- (i) section 842(h) or (i) of title 18, or section 844(d), (e), (f), (g), (h), or (i) of that title (relating to explosive materials offenses); (ii) section 922(g)(1), (2), (3), (4), or (5), (j), (n), (o), (p), or (r) or 924(b) or (h) of title 18 (relating to firearms offenses); or (iii) section 5861 of title 26 (relating to firearms offenses); (F) a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18, but not including a purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment at 5 least one year; (G) a theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) or burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment at 5 least one year; (H) an offense described in section 875, 876, 877, or 1202 of title 18 (relating to the demand for or receipt of ransom); (I) an offense described in section 2251, 2251A, or 2252 of title 18 (relating to child pornography); (J) an offense described in section 1962 of title 18 (relating to racketeer influenced corrupt organizations), or an offense described in section 1084 (if it is a second or subsequent offense) or 1955 of that title (relating to gambling offenses), for which a sentence of one year imprisonment or more may be imposed; (K) an offense that- (i) relates to the owning, controlling, managing, or supervising of a prostitution business; (ii) is described in section 2421, 2422, or 2423 of title 18 (relating to transportation for the purpose of prostitution) if committed for commercial advantage; or (iii) is described in any of sections 1581–1585 or 1588–1591 of title 18 (relating to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, and trafficking in persons); (L) an offense described in- (i) section 793 (relating to gathering or transmitting national defense information), 798 (relating to disclosure of classified information), 2153 (relating to sabotage) or 2381 or 2382 (relating to treason) of title 18; (ii) section 3121 of title 50 (relating to protecting the identity of undercover intelligence agents); or (iii) section 3121 of title 50 (relating to protecting the identity of undercover agents); (M) an offense that- (i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000; or (ii) is described in section 7201 of title 26 (relating to tax evasion) in which the revenue loss to the Government exceeds $10,000; (N) an offense described in paragraph (1)(A) or (2) of section 1324(a) of this title (relating to alien smuggling), except in the case of a first offense for which the alien has affirmatively shown that the alien committed the
The Circuit Court with jurisdiction over the geographical location of the Immigration Court will control. See Matter of Garcia, 28 I&N Dec. 693 (BIA 2023). For choice of law purposes, the controlling circuit law in Immigration Court proceedings is the law governing the geographic location of the Immigration Court where venue lies, namely where jurisdiction vests and proceedings commence upon the filing of a charging document, and will only change if an Immigration Judge subsequently grants a change of venue to another Immigration Court. Matter of R-C-R-, 28 I&N Dec. 74 (BIA 2020), clarified.
DEFINITION OF ARRIVING ALIEN The regulations define “arriving alien” at 8 CFR §1001.1(q): The term arriving alien means an applicant for admission coming or attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-entry, or an alien seeking transit through the United States at a port-of-entry, or an alien interdicted in international or United States waters and brought into the United States by any means, whether or not to a designated port-of-entry, and regardless of the means of transport. An arriving alien remains an arriving alien even if paroled pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the Act, and even after any such parole is terminated or revoked. However, an arriving alien who was paroled into the United States before April 1, 1997, or who was paroled into the United States on or after April 1, 1997, pursuant to a grant of advance parole which the alien applied for and obtained in the United States prior to the alien’s departure from and return to the United States, will not be treated, solely by reason of that grant of parole, as an arriving alien under section 235(b)(1)(A)(i) of the Act. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.2, 1001.1(q) Arriving Alien vs. Applicant for Admission While the term “applicant for admission” is not defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the statute broadly identifies those who fall within the term’s parameters as any noncitizen who: is present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including a[] [noncitizen] who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters). See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1); see also 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(f)(2) (discussing noncitizens present without admission or parole and those who enter without inspection), (f)(3) (explaining that noncitizens interdicted at sea are applicants for admission); but see 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(f)(4) (clarifying that a stowaway is not an applicant for admission). As such, someone classified as an “arriving [noncitizen]” also is an applicant for admission. However, the latter category is broader than the former so not all applicants for admission are arriving noncitizens. That is, while individuals who enter the United States without inspection are considered applicants for admission, they are not arriving noncitizens as they did not seek admission at a port-of-entry. A noncitizen who was admitted after inspection is neither an applicant for admission nor an arriving noncitizen, even if that person subsequently falls out of status. Arriving Aliens in Removal Proceedings § 1240.8 Burdens of proof in removal proceedings. (b) Arriving aliens. In proceedings commenced upon a respondent’s arrival in the United States or after the revocation or expiration of parole, the respondent must prove that he or she is clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted to the United States and is not inadmissible as charged. Arriving aliens in expedited removal proceedings are subject to mandatory detention, pending a credible fear determination, and if no credible fear, until removed. See INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(i)(IV). Generally, arriving aliens placed in 240 proceedings, shall also be detained. See INA § 235(b)(2)(A). An alien “shall be detained pending determination and removal” while inadmissibility is being considered under 8 C.F.R. § 235.3. Mandatory Detention Arriving aliens in expedited removal proceedings are subject to mandatory detention, pending a crediblefear determination, and if no credible fear, until removed. INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(i)(IV). Generally, arriving aliens placed in 240 proceedings, shall also be detained. INA § 235(b)(2)(A). An alien “shall be detained pending determination and removal” while inadmissibility is being considered under 8 C.F.R. § 235.3. ARRIVING ALIEN CASE LAW Failure to check the box indicating the respondent is an arriving alien is not grounds for termination of proceedings. Matter of Jonathan Said HERRERA-VASQUEZ, 27 I&N Dec. 825 (BIA 2020) An alien that is transferred from expedited removal proceedings to full removal proceeding after establishing a credible fear, remains ineligible for bond. Matter of M-S-, 27 I&N Dec. 509 (A.G. 2019). Matter of M-S- overrules overruled Matter of X-K-, 23 I&N Dec. 731 (BIA 2005). Arriving Aliens and Adjustment of Status The regulations detail which agency (USCIS or EOIR) has jurisdiction over an adjustment application filed by an arriving noncitizen who is in removal proceedings. With respect to USCIS, 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(1) specifies that it has jurisdiction over the adjustment application of any noncitizen “unless the immigration judge has jurisdiction to adjudicate the application under 8 C.F.R. § 1245.2(a)(1).” Thus, USCIS has jurisdiction over all adjustment applications except those over which an immigration judge has jurisdiction. In turn, 8 C.F.R. § 1245.2(a)(1) states that an immigration judge does not have jurisdiction over an adjustment application of an “arriving [noncitizen]” in removal proceedings, with one exception. Under this exception, an immigration judge has jurisdiction over the adjustment application of an arriving noncitizen in removal proceedings if: Does USCIS have jurisdiction to decide an adjustment application if the arriving noncitizen is under a final order of removal? Yes, USCIS has jurisdiction over the adjustment application of an arriving noncitizen even when a removal order has become administratively final, as long as the order has not been executed— that is, as long as the individual has not departed, whether voluntarily or not, after the removal order was issued. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(g) (specifying that a noncitizen who departs the United States while under an order of removal “shall be considered to have been deported or removed”). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), a noncitizen must be admissible to the United States to adjust status.Significantly, as explained in a USCIS memorandum, “[t]he removal order, itself, does not makethe [noncitizen] inadmissible until it is executed.”20 Thus the removal order is not a bar toadjustment. However, practitioners still must consider whether the underlying ground uponwhich the removal order is based renders the noncitizen inadmissible and therefore ineligible foradjustment and, if it does, whether a waiver is available. For example, where the removal order isbased on 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)—the inadmissibility ground for individuals who did not have avalid visa or
Administrative Closure Administrative closure can be requested by either the government or the respondent. It may be offered by the government when they prefer not to take testimony or where there potential issued regarding whether someone should receive asylum or another form of relief. This may occur if there are issues with jurisdiction, timeliness, or other procedural matters. When administratively closed, your case technically remains “pending” with the immigration court and can be re-opened at any time by either party or the judge. The greatest benefit of administrative closure is that employment authorization remains valid and can continue to be renewed since the underlying application for relief is still pending, although there are no future hearing dates being scheduled and that application will not ever be adjudicated unless things change. When a case is administratively closed a person remains in removal proceedings. It is essentially just removing the case from the Court’s calendar so there are no more future hearing dates, but the case is still before the Court. If the respondent wants to pursue relief before USCIS they would need to dispose of the case before the Court first since jurisdiction is still vested with the Court. For the same reason the respondent cannot leave the country without “self-deporting.” DHS used to agree to administrative closure as a matter of PD more often than they do now. Dismissal is now the much preferred way of exercising PD.
Termination of Proceedings Proceedings may only be terminated when there is a legal basis for doing so. A motion to terminate asks an Immigration Judge to end the proceedings by alleging that the government’s charges are substantively or procedurally defective. The Immigration Judge’s authority to terminate proceedings are limited by regulations 8 CFR § 1003.10(b) and 8 CFR § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii), which give Courts and the BIA the power to take “any action” that is “appropriate and necessary” to dispose of a case. The Board defined the specifics of this in more detail in in Matter of S-O-G- & F-D-B-. The AG later set the rule that controls now from Matter of S-O-G-. In Matter of S-O-G, the AG held that Immigration Judges, “have no inherent authority to terminate or dismiss removal proceedings” even if a case presents compelling circumstances, restricting Immigration Judge’s discretion to terminate. However, the decision also held that the IJ can terminate proceedings if it is expressly authorized by (1) 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f), where a respondent is eligible for naturalization, has a pending naturalization application, and has exceptionally appealing or humanitarian factors in their case, and (2) under 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(c) where DHS moves to dismiss a notice to appear. This decision, however, does not affect motions to terminate that are grounded in law. An Immigration Judge continues to maintain the authority to terminate for any nondiscretionary basis supported by the BIA or judicial decisions, for example lack of subject matter discretion, improperly served NTA, regulatory violations, or res judicata. Termination is like dismissal in that is completely ends the removal proceedings. Any applications before the Court are no longer pending and nothing further must be done to pursue another immigration benefit through other means. Termination can be with or without prejudice. If with prejudice then the respondent cannot be put into removal proceedings again for the same reasons in that first Notice to Appear.
A Notice to Appear (“NTA”) initiates removal proceedings by informing the immigrant respondent that they must appear in Immigration Court on a specific day to answer to a charge of removeability. An NTA is issued as a standard DHS form, Form I-862. The statutory requirements of an NTA can be found at INA § 239 & 8 USC § 1229 as well as the regulatory requirements at 8 CFR §§ 1229 and 1239.1. Every NTA should include the respondent’s identifying information,4 the nature of the proceedings, the charges of removability and supporting factual allegations, the date and place of removal proceedings, advisals of certain rights and responsibilities, and a certificate of service. The statute and regulations require DHS to include all this information in the NTA. The NTA will specify the nature of the proceedings in a series of three check boxes under the Respondent’s name and address. The NTA will inform the individual if they are being charged as an “arriving alien,” an individual present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled, or someone who was admitted but is removable for the reasons stated. In support of the charges of removability, DHS should also include on the NTA a list of factual allegations that establish the respondent’s alienage (their country of birth or nationality) and other facts that support the charges of removal. DHS sometimes uses information provided by the respondent in prior applications filed for immigration benefits or statements made to CBP, ICE, or USCIS officers. However, it is not uncommon for the NTA to allege erroneous or incomplete facts in a respondent’s case based on inaccurate or incomplete information provided by DHS databases or officers. Finally, the NTA also contains a number of warnings and advisals to the respondent about their rights and responsibilities while in removal proceedings, such as the right to obtain counsel, the responsibility to inform the government of any change of address, and the consequences of failing to provide a change of address or failing to appear for a scheduled hearing.
+ 5 Articles
Show More
