The NY Clean Slate Act took effect on November 16, 2024. Under the Clean Slate Act individuals convicted of crimes (other than sex crimes and non-drug related Class A Felonies) in the State of New York will have their conviction(s) automatically sealed after a waiting period. The waiting period being three years for a misdemeanor conviction and eight years for a felony conviction. The waiting period to start running after they are sentenced and complete any term of imprisonment. The person cannot get convicted of a new offense during that time period and they must complete any probation, parole, or community service and otherwise comply with any post-release supervision. The person cannot have any pending criminal charges either. Under the CSA, if an individual was convicted of a felony in 2007 and served two years in jail then was never convicted of another crime then that conviction will automatically be sealed by the State of New York by November 16, 2027. This will help thousands of individuals with criminal records to be able to find employment and access housing much more easily. Limitations of the NY Clean Slate Act This law will help many New Yorkers but it is important that the large immigrant population in New York understand the limitations of this law. The records that are sealed don’t disappear from your record. The sealed records may also still be seen when applying for a firearm license or for employment in law enforcement or certain positions that involve caring for children. Other potential employers that may access your sealed records include: Also, your sealed records are still going to be accessible to: How Will the Clean Slate Act Effect Eligibility For Immigration Benefits? As it relates to US immigration it is important to note that the sealing of your records under the Clean Slate Act will have no impact for immigration purposes. As previously explained, the sealed records can still be seen by law enforcement and the DMV, and Federal Immigration Officials. Most importantly, a sealed criminal record must still be disclosed to immigration. If you were arrested and convicted of a crime that is sealed under CSA or any other provision of NYS law you are still required to answer in the affirmative on any form that has the question “have you ever been arrested, cited, or detained by law enforcement?” or “have you ever been convicted of a crime?” The same is true if you are asked the question by a Government official either at an immigration interview, in Court, or while traveling and passing through customs. A conviction that is sealed under the CSA will still render a noncitizen removable or inadmissible regardless of whether or not is sealed. A conviction is a conviction and there is no exception in the law for sealed convictions. Section 101(a)(48) (A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act defines conviction as: (48)(A) The term “conviction” means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where- (i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and (ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed. See INA §101(a)(48) (A); 8 CFR §1101 (a)(48). What About Other NYS Laws That Allow For Sealing of Records After 10 Years or For Marijuana Possession Offenses? They will not impact immigration eligibility either. It would still be considered a conviction under US immigration law. The Board of Immigration Appeals has addressed the issue in various contexts. Matter of Chavez-Alvarez, 26 I. & N. Dec. 274 (BIA Mar. 14, 2014); Matter of Cuellar-Gomez, 25 I&N Dec. 850, 855 (BIA Jul. 18, 2012) (Kansas conviction of possession of marijuana, in violation of a Wichita municipal ordinance, constituted a conviction for immigration proceedings because the Wichita proceedings required proof beyond a reasonable doubt, even though there was no right to counsel or jury trial). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has as well, “formal judgment of guilt” is defined by reference to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(k)(1), which provides that “[i]n the judgment of conviction, the court must set forth the plea, the jury verdict or the court’s findings, the adjudication, and the sentence.”Puello v. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Servs., 511 F.3d 324, 329 (2d Cir. 2007). Just because New York State decided to seal the records does not change their impact under Federal Law. See Matter of German Santos, 28 I&N Dec. 552, 557 (BIA 2022) (stating that whether immigration consequences flow from a State conviction is “a question of federal, not state, law, despite the fact that the predicate offense and its punishment are defined by the law of the State”). In 2024 the Board of Immigration Appeals issued a precedential decision regarding the circumstances under which a State Court vacates a conviction, which is extremely similar to this exact issue. The Board addressed whether the State’s vacatur would be recognized for immigration purposes. See Matter of Azrag, 28 I&N Dec. 784 (BIA 2024). In that case a noncitizen in Kansas was convicted of a removable offense. The State of Kansas ended up vacating that criminal conviction and allowing him to plea to a lower charge that, if recognized for immigration purposes, would defeat the charges of removability and allow him to keep his legal permanent resident status.     The Board found insufficient evidence in the record to determine that the convictions were vacated because of a defect in his criminal proceedings (that is, the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel). The general rule with state court vacaturs is that they are recognized for immigration purposes when they are related to a substantive or procedural defect in the underlying proceedings; they are not recognized when they are done for purely rehabilitative purposes, such

What is considered a “conviction” for immigration purposes? Statute & Regulations Section 101(a)(48) (A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act defines conviction as: (48)(A) The term “conviction” means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where- (i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and (ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed. See INA §101(a)(48) (A); 8 CFR §1101 (a)(48). CASE LAW The Board of Immigration Appeals has addressed the issue in various contexts. Matter of Chavez-Alvarez, 26 I. & N. Dec. 274 (BIA Mar. 14, 2014); Matter of Cuellar-Gomez, 25 I&N Dec. 850, 855 (BIA Jul. 18, 2012) (Kansas conviction of possession of marijuana, in violation of a Wichita municipal ordinance, constituted a conviction for immigration proceedings because the Wichita proceedings required proof beyond a reasonable doubt, even though there was no right to counsel or jury trial). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has as well, “formal judgment of guilt” is defined by reference to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(k)(1), which provides that “[i]n the judgment of conviction, the court must set forth the plea, the jury verdict or the court’s findings, the adjudication, and the sentence.”Puello v. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Servs., 511 F.3d 324, 329 (2d Cir. 2007). Just because New York State decided to seal the records does not change their impact under Federal Law. See Matter of German Santos, 28 I&N Dec. 552, 557 (BIA 2022) (stating that whether immigration consequences flow from a State conviction is “a question of federal, not state, law, despite the fact that the predicate offense and its punishment are defined by the law of the State”). Matter of Azrag, 28 I&N Dec. 784 (BIA 2024) In 2024 the Board of Immigration Appeals issued a precedential decision regarding the circumstances under which a State Court vacates a conviction, which is extremely similar to this exact issue. The Board addressed whether the State’s vacatur would be recognized for immigration purposes. See Matter of Azrag, 28 I&N Dec. 784 (BIA 2024). In that case a noncitizen in Kansas was convicted of a removable offense. The State of Kansas ended up vacating that criminal conviction and allowing him to plea to a lower charge that, if recognized for immigration purposes, would defeat the charges of removability and allow him to keep his legal permanent resident status.     The Board found insufficient evidence in the record to determine that the convictions were vacated because of a defect in his criminal proceedings (that is, the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel). The general rule with state court vacaturs is that they are recognized for immigration purposes when they are related to a substantive or procedural defect in the underlying proceedings; they are not recognized when they are done for purely rehabilitative purposes, such as to avoid immigration consequences. The Clean Slate Act does not vacate convictions, rather seals them, but it does so for rehabilitative purposes. The records are sealed after a set period of years upon showing rehabilitation. It has nothing to do with any defect in the underlying court proceedings or the law, so it would never be recognized for immigration purposes pursuant to Matter of Azrag, 28 I&N Dec. 784 (BIA 2024). If your conviction is vacated because of legal reasons relating to the underlying case then immigration will recognize that but cases that are disposed of for rehabilitation alone will remain as convictions will full force and effect. Matter of R-T-P-, 28 I&N Dec. 828 (BIA 2024) [full decision] (1) Under the statutory definition of “conviction” provided at section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (Supp. II 1996), no effect is to be given in immigration proceedings to a state action which purports to expunge, dismiss, cancel, vacate, discharge, or otherwise remove a guilty plea or other record of guilt or conviction by operation of a state rehabilitative statute. (2) With the enactment of the federal statute defining “conviction” with respect to an alien, our decisions in Matter of G-, 9 I&N Dec. 159 (BIA 1960, A.G. 1961); Matter of Ibarra Obando, 12 I&N Dec. 576 (BIA 1966, A.G. 1967); Matter of Luviano, 21 I&N Dec. 235 (BIA 1996), and others which address the impact of state rehabilitative actions on whether an alien is “convicted” for immigration purposes are no longer controlling. (3) Once an alien is subject to a “conviction” as that term is defined at section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, the alien remains convicted for immigration purposes notwithstanding a subsequent state action purporting to erase the original determination of guilt through a rehabilitative procedure. (4) The policy exception in Matter of Manrique, 21 I&N Dec. 58 (BIA 1995), which accorded federal first offender treatment to certain drug offenders who had received state rehabilitative treatment is superseded by the enactment of section 101(a)(48)(A), which gives no effect to state rehabilitative actions in immigration proceedings. Matter of Manrique, supra, superseded. (5) An alien, who has had his guilty plea to the offense of possession of a controlled substance vacated and his case dismissed upon termination of his probation pursuant to section 19- 2604(1) of the Idaho Code, is considered to have a conviction for immigration purposes. Conviction Without Sentence The statutory definition of conviction, for immigration purposes, requires that the court must have ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed. INA 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A)(2010). As the Second, Third and Fifth Circuits have held, a formal judgment of guilt requires that the court must set forth the plea, the jury verdict or the court’s findings, the adjudication, and the sentence. Singh v. Holder, 568 F.3d 525, 530 (5th Cir. 2009)

Matter of Mogtabi Hassan AZRAG, 28 I&N Dec. 784 (BIA 2024) February 23, 2024 the Board of Immigration Appeals issued a precedential decision regarding the circumstances under which a State Court vacates a conviction, which is extremely similar to this exact issue. The Board addressed whether the State’s vacatur would be recognized for immigration purposes. See Matter of Azrag, 28 I&N Dec. 784 (BIA 2024). In that case a noncitizen in Kansas was convicted of a removable offense. The State of Kansas ended up vacating that criminal conviction and allowing him to plea to a lower charge that, if recognized for immigration purposes, would defeat the charges of removability and allow him to keep his legal permanent resident status.     The Board found insufficient evidence in the record to determine that the convictions were vacated because of a defect in his criminal proceedings (that is, the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel). The general rule with state court vacaturs is that they are recognized for immigration purposes when they are related to a substantive or procedural defect in the underlying proceedings; they are not recognized when they are done for purely rehabilitative purposes, such as to avoid immigration consequences. The Clean Slate Act does not vacate convictions, rather seals them, but it does so for rehabilitative purposes. The records are sealed after a set period of years upon showing rehabilitation. It has nothing to do with any defect in the underlying court proceedings or the law, so it would never be recognized for immigration purposes pursuant to Matter of Azrag, 28 I&N Dec. 784 (BIA 2024). If your conviction is vacated because of legal reasons relating to the underlying case then immigration will recognize that but cases that are disposed of for rehabilitation alone will remain as convictions will full force and effect. Full Decision.

The Second Circuit has found that NY defines narcotic in a way that is overbroad and includes substances that are not on the federally controlled substance schedules and therefore, under the categorical approach, are not controlled substance offenses. U.S. v. Minter, No. 21-3102 (2d Cir. 2023) The issue on appeal is whether Defendant’s 2014 conviction under New York Penal Law Section 220.39(1) for the sale of cocaine was for a “serious drug offense” and therefore qualifies as a predicate offense for the purposes of a sentencing enhancement under the ACCA. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that New York’s definition of cocaine is categorically broader than its federal counterpart, thus, Defendant’s cocaine conviction cannot serve as a predicate ACCA offense. The government argued that under Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez, that even if the New York definition of cocaine is broadly construed to criminalize all its isomers, Minter must show a “realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,” that New York’s statute is broader in practice. The court explained that here, the New York statute applies on its face to all cocaine isomers; the CSA does not. In citing Hylton, the court wrote, “When the state law is facially overbroad, we look no further.” NOTE: Reason to believe charges do not require a conviction. See reason to believe. NY Penal Law § 220.39: Criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree There are several offenses prohibiting selling drugs in the New York Penal Code. Most require that you sell or attempt to sell a minimum amount of specific types of drugs in order to be prosecuted. You will have committed the crime of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree under New York Penal Code § 220.39 if you knowingly and unlawfully sell drugs as follows: In addition you could be prosecuted for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree if you sell narcotics to someone who is under the age of 21, or you sell a stimulant, hallucinogen, hallucinogenic substance, or lysergic acid diethylamide and you previously have been convicted of a drug offense.

A conviction for selling a simulated controlled substance that was not actually a controlled substance is not an offense relating to a controlled substance under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i). Matter of Sanchez-Cornejo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 273 (BIA 2010). INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i) – Offense “Relating To” a Controlled Substance Any alien who at time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802), other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of thirty grams or less of marijuana is deportable. Matter of Sanchez-Cornejo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 273 (BIA 2010) Texas conviction of delivery of a simulated controlled substance, as defined by 482.001(4) of the Texas Health and Safety Code, is not an aggravated felony drug trafficking offense because federal law does not punish distribution of a non-controlled substance in place of a real controlled substance; the violation is, however, a controlled substances offense for purposes of triggering removability under INA 237(a)(2)(B). For NY Controlled Substance Convictions the sale of actual controlled substances may not be a crime related to a controlled substance. See U.S. v. Minter, No. 21-3102 (2d Cir. 2023).

SINGLE MARIJUANA OFFENSE EXCEPTION Exception for single conviction for marijuana under 30 grams. INA 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006). For purposes of INA 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006), the phrase a single offense involving possession for ones own use of thirty grams or less of marijuana calls for a circumstance-specific inquiry; a respondent convicted of more than one marijuana-related offense arising out of the same underlying facts may still meet the single offense exception. See Matter of Davey, 26 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2012). Matter of Davey, 26 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2012) Arizona convictions of possession of marijuana, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Statute 13-3405(A)(1), and possession of drug paraphernalia (the plastic bag in which the marijuana was contained), Ariz. Rev. Statute 13-3415(A), constituted a single offense involving a small quantity of marijuana, under INA 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), since Congress meant offense in this statute to refer to the totality of an aliens specific acts on a single occasion, so the exception is available to a noncitizen convicted of more than one statutory offense, provided that each crime involved a single incident in which the alien possessed a small amount of marijuana for personal use.); following the reasoning of Matter of Martinez-Espinoza, 25 I&N Dec. 118, 124 (BIA 2009) (we concluded that the term offense used in [INA] section 212(h) was best understood as refer[ring] to the specific unlawful acts that made the alien inadmissible, rather than to any generic crime.).

Aggravated felonies are defined at 8 USC § 1101(a)(43), which lists dozens of common-law terms and references to federal statutes. Aggravated felonies (“AF”) are the convictions with the most serious immigration consequences for a noncitizen. Noncitizens who have been convicted of an AF are prohibited from receiving most forms of relief from deportation, including asylum, and from being readmitted to the United States at any time in the future. A noncitizen who is convicted of an aggravated felony, deported or removed, and then returns to the U.S. without permission faces a tough federal prison sentence under 8 USC §1326(b)(2). Mandatory Detention for Aggravated Felonies Federal immigration authorities are required to detain any immigrant convicted of an “aggravated felony” upon his or her release from criminal custody. To obtain bond from an immigration judge, LPRs who are detained following a conviction of a potential “aggravated felony” must demonstrate with substantial likelihood that the crime in question does not qualify as an “aggravated felony. Aggravated Felony Bars Relief LPR Cancellation of Removal LPRs who have been convicted of an aggravated felony cannot receive 42A LPR cancellation of removal. Asylum Particularly serious crimes bar asylum relief and a conviction for any aggravated felony is considered a particularly serious crime in asylum determinations, regardless of the term of criminal incarceration. In addition, for purposes of asylum, additional crimes may be defined as “particularly serious crimes” or “serious nonpolitical crimes” by regulation. See 8 USC § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i). Further, courts have held that the Attorney General may designate a specific offense as a “particularly serious crime” through case-by-case adjudication. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(ii). Waivers Certain LPRs may not obtain a waiver of inadmissibility under Section 212(h) of the INA if they were convicted of an AF. A 212(h) waiver can waive criminal offenses that make a noncitizen inadmissible and allow for them to be admitted to the United States. Voluntary Departure An immigrant convicted of an aggravated felony is ineligible for voluntary departure. Voluntary departure is a discretionary form of relief allowing a deportable noncitizen to leave the country at their own expense in place of formal deportation. Permanent Inadmissibility Following Departure from the United States A noncitizen removed from the United States after being convicted of an aggravated felony (or who leaveswhile an order of removal is outstanding) is permanently inadmissible. To lawfully reenter the United States, such an immigrant must receive a special waiver from USCIS, in addition to meeting all other grounds of admissibility. Deportation without a Removal Hearing Certain noncitizens convicted of an aggravated felony are provided fewer legal protections than otherimmigrants. Any noncitizen convicted of an aggravated felony who is not a lawful permanent resident (LPR) may be administratively removed/deported from the United States without a formal hearing before anImmigration Judge. See INA § 238, 8 U.S.C. § 1228. What is an Aggravated Felony Statute – INA § 101(a)(43) (43) The term “aggravated felony” means- (A) murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor; (B) illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21), including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of title 18); See section 802 of Title 21 here. (C) illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices (as defined in section 921 of title 18) or in explosive materials (as defined in section 841(c) of that title); (D) an offense described in section 1956 of title 18 (relating to laundering of monetary instruments) or section 1957 of that title (relating to engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specific unlawful activity) if the amount of the funds exceeded $10,000; (E) an offense described in- (i) section 842(h) or (i) of title 18, or section 844(d), (e), (f), (g), (h), or (i) of that title (relating to explosive materials offenses); (ii) section 922(g)(1), (2), (3), (4), or (5), (j), (n), (o), (p), or (r) or 924(b) or (h) of title 18 (relating to firearms offenses); or (iii) section 5861 of title 26 (relating to firearms offenses); (F) a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18, but not including a purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment at 5 least one year; (G) a theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) or burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment at 5 least one year; (H) an offense described in section 875, 876, 877, or 1202 of title 18 (relating to the demand for or receipt of ransom); (I) an offense described in section 2251, 2251A, or 2252 of title 18 (relating to child pornography); (J) an offense described in section 1962 of title 18 (relating to racketeer influenced corrupt organizations), or an offense described in section 1084 (if it is a second or subsequent offense) or 1955 of that title (relating to gambling offenses), for which a sentence of one year imprisonment or more may be imposed; (K) an offense that- (i) relates to the owning, controlling, managing, or supervising of a prostitution business; (ii) is described in section 2421, 2422, or 2423 of title 18 (relating to transportation for the purpose of prostitution) if committed for commercial advantage; or (iii) is described in any of sections 1581–1585 or 1588–1591 of title 18 (relating to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, and trafficking in persons); (L) an offense described in- (i) section 793 (relating to gathering or transmitting national defense information), 798 (relating to disclosure of classified information), 2153 (relating to sabotage) or 2381 or 2382 (relating to treason) of title 18; (ii) section 3121 of title 50 (relating to protecting the identity of undercover intelligence agents); or (iii) section 3121 of title 50 (relating to protecting the identity of undercover agents); (M) an offense that- (i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000; or (ii) is described in section 7201 of title 26 (relating to tax evasion) in which the revenue loss to the Government exceeds $10,000; (N) an offense described in paragraph (1)(A) or (2) of section 1324(a) of this title (relating to alien smuggling), except in the case of a first offense for which the alien has affirmatively shown that the alien committed the