The Court’s Decision:

To initiate the removal of an alien from the United States who is either “inadmissible” under 8 U. S. C. §1182 or “deportable” under §1227, the Federal Government must provide the alien with “written notice” of the proceedings. §§1229(a)(1), (2). Two types of “written notice” are described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of §1229(a): Paragraph (1) provides that the alien be given a written “ ‘notice to appear,’ ” or NTA, which must set out, among other things, “[t]he time and place at which the proceedings will be held.” Paragraph (2) states that “in the case of any change or postponement in the time and place of such proceedings,” the agency must provide “a written notice” specifying “the new time or place of the proceedings” and “the consequences” of failing to attend. An alien who fails to attend a hearing despite receiving notice “shall be ordered removed in absentia” if the Government “establishes by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence” that “the written notice” was provided and that “the alien is removable.” §1229a(b)(5)(A). Three scenarios permit the rescinding of an in absentia removal order, one of which is when an alien “demonstrates that [he] did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2)” of §1229(a). §1229a(b)(5)(C (ii).

In these consolidated cases (one from the Fifth Circuit, and two from the Ninth), aliens Esmelis Campos-Chaves, Varinder Singh, and Raul Daniel Mendez-Colín, each moved to rescind his in absentia order of removal on the ground that he did not receive proper notice of the removal hearing. In each case, the Government provided an initial NTA, but the NTA did not specify the time and place of the removal hearing. Eventually, the Government provided each alien with a notice of hearing under §1229(a)(2) which set out the specific time and place of the removal hearing. None of the aliens showed up for his hearing, and each was ordered removed in absentia by an Immigration Judge. Each then sought to rescind the removal order, arguing that he did not receive a proper NTA under §1229(a)(1). The Fifth Circuit considered and denied one of the petitions, but the Ninth Circuit granted the other two.

Held: Because each of the aliens in this case received a proper §1229(a)(2) notice for the hearings they missed and at which they were ordered removed, they cannot seek rescission of their in absentia removal orders on the basis of defective notice under §1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). Pp 7–16.

(a) These cases turn on whether Campos-Chaves, Singh, and Mendez-Colín can “demonstrat[e]” that they “did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a).” §1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). The Government reads that provision to permit rescission only when the alien did not receive notice of the hearing he failed to attend. Campos-Chaves, Singh, and Mendez-Colín, on the other hand, urge a reading of the provision’s word “or” that would distribute the phrase “did not receive notice in accordance with” across “paragraph (1) or (2).” They argue that because each can “demonstrat[e]” that he “did not receive” an NTA, they each can seek rescission of their in absentia removal orders. Pp. 7–8.

(b) The Government’s provision of a single notice under either paragraph (1) or (2) defeats rescission under §1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). The word “ ‘or’ ” is “ ‘almost always disjunctive.’ ” Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 584 U. S. 79, 87. Thus, §1229a(b)(5)’s ordinary meaning is that either a paragraph (1) notice or a paragraph (2) notice can count as “notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2).” Statutory contexts points in the same direction. For example, nearby §1229a(b)(5)(A) also refers to “paragraph (1) or (2)” notice. There, however, the “or” is unambiguously disjunctive, and there is no way to distribute language across the “or” that can provide an alternative meaning. Furthermore, subparagraph (A) requires the Government to establish that it provided “the written notice,” indicating that only a single notice must be provided in a single document. Niz-Chavez, 593 U. S., at 166. Pp. 8–10.

(c) In §1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii), “notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2)” refers to the notice for the hearing the alien missed and at which he was ordered removed. Notice under paragraph (2) supersedes the NTA; when there is paragraph (2) notice, it is that notice which informs the alien when to appear, not the NTA. As previously noted, §1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii)’s “notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2)” must correspond with §1229(b)(5)(A)’s “the written notice.” The only way to make sense of §1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii)’s reference to a single notice is for that notice to be the one that informed the alien of the time and date of the hearing the alien missed, and at which he was ordered removed. That reading also gives the provision a “substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.” United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365, 371. Pp. 10–12.

(d) Campos-Chaves, Singh, and Mendez-Colín all received “notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2)” for the hearings they missed, and thus their in absentia removal orders may not be rescinded on that ground. The Government concedes that none of them received a compliant NTA. Each did, however, receive a “notice in accordance with paragraph . . . (2),” and each notice met all of the requirements for a notice under that provision. After receiving a defective NTA, each alien received a notice that provided a specific time and place for their removal proceedings. Those notices provided “new” times, and thereby “change[d]” the time and place of their removal proceedings, within the meaning of §1229(a)(2). Pp. 13–16.

 Campos-Chaves v Garland, 602 U.S. __ (2024)